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Deborah H. Schenkt
In making decisions, individuals rely on heuristics or cognitive biases.
One of these is salience, which refers to visibility or prominence. Individuals
are likely to focus on information or items that are prominent or salient and
ignore those that are less visible. This Article develops an argument for
exploiting this cognitive bias in designing or modifying taxes. Most
commentary assumes that the intentional use of low-salience taxes by the
government is undesirable and that increased salience is always required; to
do otherwise is to take advantage of the cognitive bias that causes individuals
to ignore taxes that are not prominent or salient. Although increasing salience
is often desirable, there is a political-economy argument for intentionally
exploiting this bias by incorporating low-salience provisions into tax design.
By clarifying the concepts of transparency, complexity, and salience, this
Article establishes a vocabulary that should facilitate more productive
exchanges among behavioral economists, cognitive psychologists, and tax
scholars regarding the salience of various revenue provisions. Moreover, and
more importantly, this Article offers the first comprehensive case for the
normative desirability of low-salience taxes. While others have suggested that
low-salience taxes may enhance economic efficiency, scholars thus far have
expressed skepticism about the desirability of low-salience taxation from a
democratic-theory perspective. This Article shows why low-salience taxation
may in fact be democracy-enhancing. The Article concludes with a case study
where the use of low-salience tax provisions is justified and effective, that is,
where Congress finds it necessary to minimize the prominence of the tax
because politically it cannot increase marginal tax rates.
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Introduction
In making decisions, individuals rely on heuristics or cognitive biases.
One of these is salience, which refers to visibility or prominence. Individuals
systematically focus on items or information that is prominent or salient and
ignore information or items that are less visible. This Article develops an
argument for exploiting this cognitive bias in designing or changing taxes.
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Public finance and tax scholars recently have begun to consider the effects
of low-salience taxes, with a focus on behavioral responses.' Some work has
been done to untangle the cognitive biases that result in less attention being
paid to low-salience taxes. Normative argument with respect to such taxes,
however, is quite limited; there is almost a universal assumption that increased
salience is preferred and that the intentional use of low-salience taxes by the
government is undesirable. This distaste is manifested in the term often used to
describe such taxes: "hidden taxes."2
Much of the criticism of so-called hidden taxes is misdirected. It usually is
lobbed in the guise of "transparency" and "complexity," terms that often are
confused in the literature with "saliency." In developing the argument that
salience may be an appropriate fiscal tool, it is useful to distinguish these
concepts. Thus, this Article begins by setting out the differences among
transparency, complexity, and salience. It establishes a vocabulary that should
facilitate more productive exchanges among behavioral economists, cognitive
psychologists, and tax scholars regarding the salience of various revenue-
raising provisions.
This Article differs significantly from past literature by rejecting the
assumption that a low-salience tax is not desirable. It offers the first
comprehensive case for the normative desirability of low-salience taxes. While
others have suggested that low-salience taxes may enhance economic
efficiency, scholars have thus far expressed skepticism about the desirability of
low-salience taxation from a democratic-theory perspective. This Article shows
why low-salience taxation may in fact be democracy-enhancing. It makes a
political-economy argument that relying on salience is an acceptable fiscal tool.
This Article considers criticisms that might be levied against the state for
manipulating salience in adopting a tax provision. It concludes that none of
these criticisms justifies a complete rejection of salience as a fiscal tool, but
that they are a caution against extensively taking advantage of cognitive biases.
Finally, this Article offers a case study where using low-salience provisions
would be justified and effective. Under the current political landscape, in which
there is a looming fiscal crisis but intense tax aversion and in which the politics
of taxation make raising additional revenue extremely difficult, Congress
would be well-advised to use low-salience provisions that make taxation more
palatable.
1. This Article was accepted for publication before a preliminary draft of a paper on a similar
subject by David Gamage and Darien Shanske became available. See David Gamage & Darien Shanske,
On Tax Salience: Market-Salience and Political-Salience (Sept. 12, 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://taxprof.typepad.com/files/gamage-1.pdf This Article thus does not discuss the
analysis by Gamage and Shanske. The fact that several scholars are simultaneously exploring the
normative implications of low-salience taxation underscores the importance of integrating behavioral
economics into tax theory.
2. See, e.g., Brian Galle, Hidden Taxes, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 59, 59 (2009); Edward A.
Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation and the Tenth Amendment: On Public Choice, Public
Interest, and Public Services, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1356 (1993).
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It is beyond question that when citizens contemplate taxes, there are
cognitive biases at work. Salience is one of these biases. While we do not know
all that we need to know about such biases, it is useful to begin to think about
whether it is appropriate for legislators to exploit these biases. It is too early to
develop a complete theory of whether this is appropriate, but we can begin to
explore when it might be.
I. Disentangling Transparency, Complexity, and Salience
Public finance and tax literature frequently confuse the terms
"transparency," "complexity," and "salience," often using them
interchangeably.3 But these terms have different meanings and target different
problems, and eliding these distinctions makes it difficult to understand the
importance of these terms. The first step in the argument for the use of salience
as a fiscal policy tool is to develop a taxonomy of terms that distinguishes
them. This Part lays out a lexicon that should be helpful in developing the use
of salience. This Article later returns to the interrelation of these concepts.
A. Transparency
The literature is replete with both arguments for transparency and
complaints about the lack of transparency. These calls for transparency take
several forms, but all share one trait: they say that transparency is desirable and
a lack of transparency is bad.4 Calls for transparency in the tax system are
common.5  Some commentators refer to transparency as requiring that
3. The ABA Tax Section, for example, "use[s] the term 'transparent' to describe tax laws that
apply in a straightforward and predictable way." AM. BAR ASS'N SECTION OF TAXATION, STATEMENT
OF POLICY FAVORING TAX SIMPLICITY, STABILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY 3,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abalmigrated/tax/pubpolicy/papers/whitepaper_
sopfavoringtaxsimplicitystabilityandtransparency.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2011). The
Tax Section's "rough test of transparency is whether a taxpayer can easily estimate the tax effect of an
increase in his or her income." Id. The Tax Section is talking about complexity, not transparency.
Meanwhile, William Gales and Peter Orszag write that "the expansion of the AMT will raise
complexity, and reduce efficiency, equity and transparency in the tax system." William G. Gales & Peter
R. Orszag, An Economic Assessment of Tax Policy in the Bush Administration, 2001-2004, 45 B.C. L.
REV. 1157, 1165 (2004). Their reference to the "transparency" of the tax is directed at salience.
4. See, e.g., FRANCIS FuKUYAMA, STATE-BUILDING: GOVERNANCE AND WORLD ORDER IN
THE 21ST CENTURY 8-9 (2004) ("Strength [of institutions] includes ... a high level of transparency and
accountability in government institutions. . . ."); Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA
L. REV. 885, 888 (2006) (stating that transparency "is clearly among the pantheon of great political
virtues"); Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983, 988-
89 (2005) (elevating transparency to the level of a "principle" and arguing that the lack of transparency
in government communications can have significant implications for public debate).
5. See, e.g., Robert Carroll et al., Moving Forward with Bipartisan Tax Policy 3 (Tax Found.,
Working Paper No. 5, 2009), available at http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/wp5.pdf ("We agree that
the federal government should . . (c]reate a more transparent and straightforward tax code."); Russell
Roberts, A Radical Re-Imagining of The Tax System, FORBES.COM (Jan. 23, 2009, 3:55 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/23/taxes-obama-recovery-oped-cxrr_0123roberts.html (calling for a
"more transparent tax system").
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information held by the government be available to the public.6 Others
complain about a lack of transparency when Congress adopts a tax provision
without hearings or debate, or entertains the proposals of lobbyists behind
closed doors.7 Still others complain that legislation is not transparent because it
is difficult to understand, because the taxpayer cannot figure out the effects of a
provision,8 or because it is impossible to determine from the face of the statute
who benefits from the tax provisions or transition rules. 9 Commentators also
object to a lack of transparency when congressional rhetoric about taxes does
not match the reality: for example, when legislators claim that the maximum
marginal tax rate has not changed, but phase-outs and rate bubbles have raised
the rate significantly for some taxpayers.10 Still others object to "hidden taxes"
because they are not transparent-by which they mean that they are not visible
or prominent." These complaints are not identical. They lump transparency
with complexity and salience.
For purposes of this Article's argument, the term "transparency" is
reserved for transparency in the political process.12 This substantially overlaps
6. See, e.g., Cheryl D. Block, Pathologies at the Intersection ofthe Budget and Tax Legislative
Processes, 43 B.C. L. REV. 863, 903 (2002) ("[T]ransparency surely requires that information be
available to the public. . . .").
7. See, e.g., Darren Goode & Robin Bravender, GOP Staff Energy Lobby in Closed Door
Talks, POLITICo (Jan. 20, 2011, 4:32 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/01 11/47867.html.
8. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS'N SECTION OF TAXATION, supra note 3, at 4 ("The Section urges the
Congress and the Administration to ... [alvoid phaseouts, minimum tax rules, and similar measures that
obscure the practical effect of tax law on economic activity.").
9. See, e.g., SUSAN J. IRVING, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-AIMD-96-129,
BUDGET PROCESS: EVOLUTION AND CHALLENGES 14 (1996), available at
www.gao.gov/archive/1996/ai96129t.pdf ("Transparency is important because the budget debate is
critically important-not because of the numbers in it but because it represents a statement about
collective priorities and collective action. In a democracy, the debate about these priorities should be
made as understandable as possible."); Block, supra note 6, at 903 (stating that information about the
budget process should be "offered in a simple format").
10. For example, when Congressman Don Pease pushed for passage of a provision limiting
itemized deductions for high-income taxpayers, he asserted: "It raises the taxes of the wealthy without
being a tax rate increase." Pease Circulates "Dear Colleague" Letter on Deduction Limits, TAX NOTES
TODAY, Oct. 24, 1990,90 TNT 217-10 (LEXIS).
11. Charles McLure, for example, asserts under the heading of transparency that "taxation
should not be imposed in ways that obscure its burden." Charles E. McLure, Jr., Rethinking State and
Local Reliance on the Retail Sales Tax: Should We Fix the Sales Tax or Discard It?, 2000 BYU L. REV.
77, 79; see also Stefano DellaVigna, Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field, 47 J. ECON.
LIT. 315, 350 (2009) (referring to low-salience taxes as "nontransparent taxes"); Christopher C. Fennell
& Lee Anne Fennell, Fear and Greed in Tax Policy: A Qualitative Research Agenda, 13 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL'Y 75, 129-33 (2003) (exploring the possibility of "transparent taxpaying," by which the authors
mean making both federal spending and the contributions of other taxpayers more visible, which might
result in "improved political efficacy of the citizenry"); Elizabeth Garrett, Accountability and Restraint,
The Federal Budget Process and the Line Item Veto Act, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 871, 924 (1999)
("[T]ransparency is particularly important because individual decisions can be lost in the midst of
detailed and obscurely worded omnibus bills. In the absence of visibility, accountability is virtually
impossible."); Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The Political Psychology ofRedistribution, 52
UCLA L. REV. 1745, 1753 (2005) (contrasting "hidden" and "transparent" taxes).
12. For examples of the use of "transparency" in this way, see Block, supra note 6, at 869 ("In
a democratic government, it is important for such decisions to be transparent and open and for
legislators to be fully accountable."); and Julie Roin, Truth in Government: Beyond the Tax Expenditure
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with transparency in governance, although the latter term often is used in a
much broader way than intended here. Transparency in governance is almost
universally viewed as a political virtue, a distinguishing characteristic of
democracy. In recent decades, it has emerged as a core aspect of governance.
Despite its position as a principal political norm, however, there is no accepted
definition of what transparency requires or from where it derives. Utilizing its
dictionary meaning, almost every conception relies on "openness" in
government in the sense of being open to view, particularly with respect to the
sharing of information. Claims with respect to transparency fall into two
classes. The first is that a transparent or open government is foundational in a
liberal democracy. 14 Under this view, the availability of laws and regulations,
as well as the openness of actions of the government, is required in a
democracy.' 5 Individuals must be informed in order for them to consent to be
governed. Furthermore, citizens must have sufficient information to engage in a
meaningful public debate about public institutions and government actions.1 6
Many of those who argue for "transparency" as a foundational matter are
arguing not only for the government to disseminate information, but also to do
so in a manner that makes the information available.
The second claim is instrumentalist. Transparency enables the public to
monitor the government and to take actions against incompetency and
corruption. Access to information improves criticism and review, enables better
government oversight and regulation, promotes better functioning markets, and
facilitates improved international relations.17 Lack of access to information
about government benefits and government spending may cause voters to make
poor political decisions about which officials to elect and which laws to
Budget, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 603 (2003) (arguing for the value of transparency with respect to tax
expenditures).
13. Thomas Blanton, The World's Right To Know, FOREIGN POL'Y, July 2002, at 50.
14. The claim that transparency is foundational often rests on James Madison. See Letter from
James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in THE COMPLETE MADISON: HIS BASIC WRITINGS 337
(Saul K. Padover ed., 1953) ("[A] people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves
with the power which knowledge gives."). For attributions to Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, see
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Senior Vice President & Chief Economist, The World Bank, Oxford Amnesty Lecture
at the Univ. of Oxford: On Liberty, the Right To Know, and Public Discourse: The Role of
Transparency in Public Life 6 (Jan. 27, 1999), available at
http://derechoasaber.org.mx/documentos/pdf0I16.pdf
15. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 16, 454 (1971) (indicating that transparency is a
necessary condition for a just society so that individuals are informed about their choices in being
governed); Fenster, supra note 4, at 898 ("Openness is a necessary condition of popular democratic
power, a predicate for effective representative government, and an indispensable part of the everyday
life of the free individual and of the wider demos.").
16. See, e.g., AMY GUTTMAN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 100-
01 (1996); JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 146-48 (1995); see also
Fenster, supra note 4, at 897 ("In short, liberal democratic theory requires the state to give an account of
itself to its public and to justify its actions to the individual and community."); Stiglitz, supra note 14, at
7 (arguing that the most compelling justification for openness is that "meaningful participation in
democratic processes requires informed participants").
17. See Fenster, supra note 4, at 899-902 (cataloguing the consequentialist claims for
transparency); Stiglitz, supra note 14, at 27.
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support. Another consequentialist claim is economic: in general, access to
information should promote better resource allocation and efficiency. Hidden
information may enable those who have the information to extract rents.
But even advocates of transparency agree that absolute transparency is
neither desirable nor necessary. For logistical and financial reasons, the
government could not function if every meeting involving government
personnel or every document passing through a government agency had to be
provided to all citizens.18 Significant privacy concerns arise in requiring the
government to release private information that must be disclosed to the
government. There are also concerns over security breaches, the quality of
government decisionmaking, and the effects on competition in the
marketplace.19 Thus, for example, Congress does not open its doors to all
committee meetings; 20 defense and security matters are exempted from the
Freedom of Information Act;21 and tax return information cannot be
disclosed.22
How transparency as a core principle is to be carried out is more
ambiguous. The general idea is that the government should operate in the open
and not in secret and should strive to make information available to the public.
Joseph Stiglitz described this type of transparency as "a basic right to know, to
be informed about what the government is doing and why."23 Some aspects of
transparency are so ingrained as to not need legislation. For example,
congressional sessions are scheduled and open to the public, hearings are
public, and legislation is printed and widely distributed. Other aspects of open
18. Fenster, supra note 4, at 902 ("Government cannot operate in a manner that provides
complete access to all proceedings and documents. Complete transparency not only would create
prohibitive logistical problems and expenditures ... but more importantly, it would impede many of the
government's most important operations . .. .").
19. See id. at 906-10 (cataloguing limitations on transparency); Stiglitz, supra note 14, at 18-
25. There are also those who argue that the benefits from transparency are minimal, see, for example,
Neal D. Finkelstein, Introduction: Transparency in Public Policy, in TRANSPARENCY IN PUBLIC
POLICY: GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 1, 1 (Neal D. Finkelstein ed., 2000); that
transparency may cause constitutional harms, see, for example, Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of
Information Act Has No Clothes, REGULATION, Mar./Apr. 1982, at 14; and that there are negative,
perhaps unintended consequences, such as security breaches, greater access to information by criminals,
increased fiscal costs, loss of privacy, and an inability to govern because of sunshine, see, for example,
Fenster, supra note 4, at 907-08, 936-38; James T. O'Reilly, FOIA and Fighting Terror: The Elusive
Nexus Between Public Access and Terrorist Attack, 64 LA. L. REv. 809, 812-14 (2004); and Laura A.
White, The Need for Governmental Secrecy: Why the U.S. Government Must Be Able To Withhold
Information in the Interest ofNational Security, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1071 (2003).
20. See STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. Doc. No. 110-9, R. XXVI, at 33 (2007),
available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/cdocuments/featured/senate.html (follow links for text
or PDF of "S. Doc. 110-9") (allowing committee meetings to be closed to the public for enumerated
reasons, including "the interest of national defense or the confidential conduct of the foreign relations of
the United States").
21. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2006) (exempting certain information from Freedom of Information
Act requirements "in the interest of national defense or foreign policy").
22. I.R.C. § 7216 (2006) (prohibiting disclosure of tax-return information by tax-return
preparers).
23. Stiglitz, supra note 14, at 1.
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government have been legislated to require the government to act in the open
and to make information available. For example, the Government in the
Sunshine Act requires federal agencies to open certain meetings to the public. 24
Also, the Freedom of Information Act requires the government to release
certain information to the public.25 Although the key component is that
information should be available to voters, it is well accepted that the
information must be accessible, complete, relevant, and reliable.
In the tax arena, transparency is widely perceived to be a desirable trait of
government, but what that means is somewhat clouded. Some of what is
required is already in place, but other manifestations of transparency are limited
or ineffective. Legislation and regulations are publicly available. 27 Citizens,
however, must have the opportunity to provide input on legislation and
regulation. The Administrative Procedure Act and internal rules generally
28provide the opportunity for anyone to comment on regulations, but it is much
more difficult to comment on other administratively issued rulings. In addition,
while Congress often holds hearings with respect to legislation, there are two
significant problems. The first is that while almost all hearings are open to the
public, it is generally not possible for citizens to regularly provide input.
Second, the legislation that ultimately is adopted is not necessarily the
legislation on which the hearings were held. Committee deliberations and
mark-ups are closed to the public, so it is often difficult for citizens to
understand Congress's intention. There is also a significant lack of
transparency in the extent to which special interests control the legislative
process. Cloaking the process in darkness hides the extent to which legislation
provides special benefits, such as tailored transition rules. A lack of
information will cause voters to make poor decisions about government
spending and revenue raising.
24. Pub. L. No.94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)).
25. Pub. L. No. 89487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 1002).
26. See, e.g., Tara Vishwanath & Daniel Kaufmann, Towards Transparency in Finance and
Governance (Sept. 6, 1999) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-258978.
Another manifestation that sometimes appears in the literature with respect to the rule of law is the
requirement that legislation not only be accessible but also comprehensible. This, however, concerns
complexity and is discussed in the next Section.
27. See GPO ACCESS, http://www.gpoaccess.gov (last visited Feb. 21, 2011) (providing free
online access to official information, including laws, regulations, and U.S. Supreme Court opinions).
28. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) ("After notice required by this section, the agency shall give
interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data,
views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation.").
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B. Complexity
Commentary decrying the complexity of the tax system is legion.29 Like
transparency, complexity has many meanings, which often overlap with both
transparency and salience. 30
For ease of explication, this Article limits complexity to refer to a
taxpayer's ability to understand and comply with a statutory provision or
regulation. As David Bradford noted, however, even that use of the term
connotes differing problems. The first is compliance complexity, which refers
to the difficulties that taxpayers face in recordkeeping, making calculations,
filing the return, and complying with the regulations imposed by the Internal
Revenue Service. The second is transactional complexity, which refers to the
costs taxpayers face in changing their behavior to minimize their tax liabilities.
The third type of complexity is rule complexity, which refers to the difficulty in
31understanding and interpreting legislative and regulatory rules.
Overlap arises because, like salience, the complexity of tax provisions can
affect or change taxpayer behavior. Transactional complexity itself
encapsulates that aspect because it references behavioral changes that occur
because of the tax rules. And although complexity can obscure salience, the
former term should be used to refer to the difficulty in understanding a rule as
opposed to how prominent it is.
Complexity can also refer to process; thus, it would not be incorrect to
note that the process of enacting tax legislation is quite complex. But to clarify
the argument, this Article limits its definition of transparency to the legislative
process, and its definition of complexity to understanding and complying with
legislation and regulations.
C. Salience
Salience is often confused with both transparency and complexity, but this
Article will distinguish it for purposes of its argument. Salience has relevance
in a number of academic disciplines, and although the meaning is not
completely consistent, it is usually a variation of the dictionary definition of
"standing out conspicuously" or "prominent." 32 Political scientists, for
29. See, e.g., Walter Alarkon & Jay Heflin, Few Lawmakers File Their Own Tax Returns,
Citing Code's Complexity, THE HILL (Apr. 14, 2010, 7:32 PM),
http://thehill.com/homenews/house/92377-few-members-file-own-returns.
30. See, e.g., Bob Williams, The Benefits of Opacity, TAxVOx (May 28, 2009, 4:00 PM),
http://taxvox.taxpolicycenter.org/blog/ archives/2009/5/28/4202956.html (noting overlap between tax
complexity and "tax awareness"); see also Carroll et al., supra note 5, at 5 (contrasting the "complexity
and opaqueness of our current tax code" with a proposed system that would be "more transparent and
simpler").
31. DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAx 266-67 (1986).
32. Salient, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/salient
(last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
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example, utilize "salience" to describe the issues that voters care about,33 and
various theories modeling political manipulation argue that politicians engage
in changing the relative salience of issues confronting voters. 34 Psychologists
and sociologists use the concept to demonstrate that the prominence of
something may affect an individual's behavior.35 Behavioral economists refer
to salience as a bias in favor of prominent or visible information that affects
people's economic behavior and responses.
It is this sense of prominence or visibility that this Article attaches to the
term salience. 3 7 With respect to taxation, salience is used to describe the degree
to which a tax or a tax provision is visible or prominent to the public. Many
commentators refer to low-salience taxes as "hidden taxes." 3 8 But "hidden tax"
33. Macartan Humphreys & John Garry, Thinking About Salience 2 (Mar. 2000) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.columbia.edul-mh2245/papersl/salience.pdf.
34. See, e.g., WILLER RIKER, THE ART OF POLITICAL MANIPULATION 151 (1986).
35. See, e.g., Shelley E. Taylor, The Availability Bias in Social Perception and Interaction, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 190, 192 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic &
Amos Twersky eds., 1982) ("Salience biases refer to the fact that colorful, dynamic, or other distinctive
stimuli disproportionately engage attention and accordingly disproportionately affect judgments.");
Leslie K. John, Alessandro Acquisti & George Loewenstein, The Best of Strangers: Context-Dependent
Willingness To Divulge Personal Information 5 (July 6, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1430482 (showing that the salience of concerns about privacy motives causes
subjects to be less willing to admit to sensitive behaviors).
36. For salience effects not relating to public finance, see, for example, Tanjim Hossain &
John Morgan, Plus Shipping and Handling: Revenue (Non) Equivalence in Field Experiments on eBay,
62 ADVANCES ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y, no. 2, 2006, at 4, available at
http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/advances/vol6/iss2/art3.
37. Another noted characteristic of something that is salient is that it is easy to process.
Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Isolation Effects and the Neglect of Indirect Effects of Fiscal
Policies, 19 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 289, 289 (2006).
38. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation,
105 YALE L.J. 325, 332 (1995); Maureen B. Cavanaugh, On the Road to Incoherence: Congress,
Economics, and Taxes, 49 UCLA L. REV. 685, 697 (2001); Galle, supra note 2, at 59; McCaffery &
Baron, supra note 37, at 289; Nancy C. Staudt, Taxation Without Representation, 55 TAX L. REV. 555,
589-90 (2002); C. Eugene Steuerle & Martin A. Sullivan, Toward More Simple and Effective Giving:
Reforming the Tax Rules for Charitable Contributions and Charitable Organizations, 12 AM. J. TAX
POL'Y 399, 446 (1995) (referring to "hidden tax rates"); Zelinsky, supra note 2, at 1356; William
Congdon, Jeffrey R. Kling & Sendhil Mullainathan, Behavioral Economics and Tax Policy 8 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. I5328, 2009), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl5328; Arno Riedl, Behavioral and Experimental Economics Can Inform
Public Policy: Some Thoughts 15-16 (Ctr. for Econ. Studies & Ifo Inst. for Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 2902, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-l 536428; Jacob Nussim, Taxes, Prices, and
Consumer Protection 40 (Jan. 20, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1397643; see also George Loewenstein, Deborah A. Small & Jeff Strnad,
Statistical, Identifiable and Iconic Victims, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE 39 (Edward J. McCaffery
& Joel Slemrod eds., 2006) (describing a hidden tax "in its pure form" as "one where all of the possible
ultimate payors believe that the tax is being paid by someone else"); J.D. Foster, Lifting the Lid on
Hidden Taxes, TAX FOUND., Apr. 15, 2000, http://www.taxfoundation.org/commentary/show/l84.html;
Brian Wingfield, Washington's Hidden Taxes, FORBES.COM (July 25, 2007, 6:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/2007/07/24/washington-taxes-congress-biz-beltway-cx-bw
0725hiddentaxes.html. Edward McCaffery and Jonathan Baron use the term "hidden taxes" in two ways.
They describe "partially hidden taxes" as those where the tax is built into the price-such as a VAT or
excise tax-and where the amount of the tax is known. In their terminology, "fully hidden taxes" are
those where the incidence of the tax is not known, such as corporate or business taxes. McCaffery &
Baron, supra note 37, at 289.
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is a misnomer.39 The taxes that are commonly labeled as hidden-such as a
value-added tax ("VAT") or a noninclusive sales tax-are not actually
"hidden" in the commonsense meaning of the word. Information about the
tax-most importantly, the rate and the commodities on which it is imposed-
is readily available to the public. 4 0 This is true with respect to specific tax
provisions as well. It is hard to think of any tax provision that is hidden in the
sense of being unknown or about which information is unavailable.41 In every
case, the information about the tax-the rates, how it is imposed, and how it is
collected-is obtainable. The taxes are "hiding" in plain sight. Thus, salience
refers to prominence, not accessibility. It is useful to think of salience in terms
of behavioral effects. A tax burden motivates behavioral change. A salient tax
(or tax provision) is predicted to affect taxpayer behavior; conversely, a low-
salience tax (or provision) predictably would change behavior less or not at all.
If taxpayers are unaware of the tax or provision, then they cannot respond to it;
if the tax or provision is not prominent, they will underreact. Thus, salience is
relevant even where the tax or provision is known.
With respect to taxes, salience and complexity overlap in several ways,
but they are not identical. If a tax is difficult to understand, compute or process
(that is, if it is complex), it is likely to be less salient. The rule complexity of
many income tax provisions causes them to lose their salience.42 More complex
taxes create more opportunities for salience to be an issue.
But very simple provisions may not be salient either. Most retail sales
taxes, for example, are relatively simple-a flat percentage of the purchase
price of a commodity-but depending on the way in which they are presented,
they may have low salience. Conversely, some highly complex provisions may
attain great prominence in the political debate. The earned income tax credit
("EITC") has very complex definitional rules and requires complex
calculations, but its existence, as well as the possibility of receiving of large
checks, has high salience.
39. Another misnomer is the term "stealth tax," which is sometimes used as an alternative to
"hidden tax." See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS'N SECTION OF TAXATION, supra note 3, at 1, 3.
40. See Susanne Lohman & Deborah M. Weiss, Hidden Taxes and Representative
Government: The Political Economy ofthe Ramsey Rule, 30 PuB. FIN. REV. 579, 584 (2002) ("After all,
tax rate information is 'public information' in the sense that the public has access to government
publications listing tax rates on all sorts of economic activities in exhaustive detail."); Edward J.
McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861, 1873 (1994) ("[A] 'hidden' tax can
actually be quite certain and knowable.").
41. Contrast this with a tax rule providing that taxpayers draw a slip of paper out of a black
box to ascertain their marginal tax rate. There, the process of determining the rate and the information
about the rates themselves would actually be hidden.
42. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Kotlikoff & David Rapson, Does It Pay, at the Margin, To Work
and Save?-Measuring Effective Marginal Taxes on Americans' Labor Supply and Saving 1, 25-28, 36
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12533, 2006), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl2533 ("[T]hanks to the incredible complexity ofthe U.S. fiscal system,
it's impossible for anyone to understand her incentive to work, save, or contribute to retirement accounts
absent highly advanced computer technology and software.").
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II. What We Know About Salience and Taxes
Although the argument this Article makes is a political one, most of what
we know about salience comes from work that looks at the effect of the
salience of particular taxes on economic decisionmaking. It is that work that
allows us to speculate on the effect of salience on political decisions with
respect to taxes.
A. Empirical Work
The argument that salience is relevant to taxes derives from behavioral
economics. In this branch of economics, economists apply the concepts of
cognitive psychology, specifically certain biases, to economic decisionmaking.
They argue that individuals operate with bounded rationality; that is,
individuals often systematically deviate from what would be expected from a
rational, self-interested person in making economic decisions.43 Therefore, the
standard assumptions made in the prevailing model of decisionmaking do not
hold." The relevance of salience is usually traced to Amos Tversky and Daniel
Kahneman, who laid out several heuristics that bias decisionmaking. 45 The
relevant one here is "availability." In making a decision, individuals are often
biased in that they rely too heavily on information that is readily available or
prominent, ignoring information that they do not see as often or as readily or
that is in the background. Tversky and Kahneman noted that "availability is
affected by factors other than frequency and probability . . . such as salience." 4 6
Thus, the salience (prominence) of an object or idea is one factor that may
cause the use of an availability heuristic to affect behavior. Other economists
studied the extent to which these biases and heuristics, including salience,
43. The standard rational-actor model posits that "all human behavior can be viewed as
involving participants who maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences and accumulate an
optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety of markets." GARY S. BECKER, THE
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976).
44. Early applications were modifications of the standard rational-actor model that led to the
idea that individuals have bounded rationality. See, e.g., HERBERT SIMON, REASON IN HUMAN AFFAIRS
19-23 (1983). Of course, modern behavioral economics does more than point out that assumptions in
standard economic models do not hold in actuality. Behavioral economists generally argue that these
assumptions are consistently violated and therefore are not useful as assumptions for modeling. As a
result, the modeling itself is invalid.
Behavioral economics is not universally accepted. Many mainstream economists reject it
entirely. For a review of the stand-off and a discussion of the sources of skepticism, see B. Douglas
Bernheim, On the Potential of Neuroeconomics: A Critical (But Hopeful) Appraisal, I AM. ECON. J.
MICROECONOMICS 1 (2009). For the purposes of its argument, this Article does not need to take a
position in the debate over the validity of the standard model of decisionmaking. Insights about
cognitive biases are relevant for tax-policy design regardless of whether they upend standard economic
models.
45. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
185 Sci. 1124 (1974).
46. Id. at 1127.
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affected economic decisionmaking.47 They tested whether individuals actually
used various heuristics to make decisions. Generally, they demonstrated that
when something was more salient (more prominent or visible), it had a more
pronounced effect on behavior and responses.
In the last decade, researchers have begun to consider whether cognitive
48
biases apply to decisionmaking with respect to taxes. Some empirical work
and modeling has been done to explore whether the salience of a tax affects
economic behavior and the ways in which it might do so. Understanding this
literature can illuminate how Congress might use salience as a fiscal tool.
In a widely cited empirical study, Raj Chetty, Adam Looney, and Kory
Kroft focused on the extent to which salience affected a consumer's perception
of price and how that affected demand for a consumption product. They
concluded that "individuals know about taxes when their attention is drawn to
the subject, but do not pay attention to taxes that are not transparent when
deciding what to buy." 49 The study established that although most consumers
knew the rate of the applicable sales tax in the location where they were
shopping, their behavior was more sensitive to after-tax prices when the
amount of sales tax was posted (in other words, quite visible). The experiment
was conducted in a supermarket where posted prices generally were exclusive
of sales tax (that is, the tax was added at the register so that a consumer needed
to know the amount of the tax and do a calculation in order to decide whether
to purchase based on the total price). To test whether consumers underreacted
to the tax-exclusive sales price, the authors also posted price tags displaying the
tax-inclusive price. The study showed that posting the tax-inclusive price
reduced demand by close to the amount of the sales tax, and from this they
inferred that most consumers usually did not take the tax into account in
making consumption decisions. Thus, the more salient tax-inclusive price
changed consumer behavior more than the less visible tax-exclusive price.50 To
offset the possibility that some behavioral change could be due to a short-run
violation of norms, the authors also studied the long-term effects of taxes on
alcohol consumption. Alcohol is subject to an excise tax included in the retail
price and a sales tax added on purchase. Looking at state-level changes in these
47. For an early application of the cognitive-psychology concept of salience to economic
theory, see George A. Akerlof, Procrastination and Obedience, 81 AM. ECON. REv. 1 (1991). Akerlof
argued that individuals systematically failed to maximize their utility. He applied what he described as
"a central principle of modern cognitive psychology" under which individuals attach too much weight to
salient events. Id. at 2.
48. The earliest work was done by Edward McCaffery and subsequently with Jonathan Baron.
See McCaffery, supra note 40; McCaffery & Baron, supra note 11.
49. Raj Chetty, Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 99
AM. ECON. REv. 1145, 1165 (2009). Although the authors used the term "transparent," it is clear from
the study that they were focusing on salience.
50. Chetty and his coauthors focused on prices rather than tax rates because they were
interested in behavioral responses to prices rather than to rates. As they noted, the tax rate may actually
be less visible in a tax-inclusive price, but the total price is more visible. Id. at 1146 n.2. This is a good
illustration of the difference between economic salience and political salience discussed below.
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two taxes along with annual data on beer consumption by state, they found that
increases in the excise tax reduced beer consumption by an order of magnitude
more than a similar increase in the sales tax.51 Again, they concluded that the
less salient tax changed behavior less.
In another empirical study, Amy Finkelstein explored the sensitivity of
drivers to the salience of tolls collected electronically. 52 The study examined
the impact of the adoption of electronic toll collection on toll rates. Her work is
useful on several fronts. Her survey data indicated that drivers who used EZ
Pass did not know either the rate at which the toll was imposed or their periodic
costs. EZ Pass is a very low-salience way of collecting tolls because unlike
drivers who hand over cash to a toll collector, a driver using EZ Pass has the
toll collected automatically while passing the toll booth. Although
information about the amount of the toll was readily available, 54 drivers either
ignored the amount of the toll or were unaware of it. Finkelstein's work
produced evidence that the salience of the tax affected commuters' elasticity of
demand.
These studies confirm the intuition that unless the amount of the tax is
prominent, consumers will make consumption decisions "pretax," even though
they are aware that a tax will be imposed and even where calculation of the tax
is relatively uncomplicated. One could imagine other economic decisions
where this is likely to be true.
There is also some limited work on the effect of salience on the politics of
taxation. Finkelstein's study also tested the oft-stated concern that low-salience
taxes make it easier for legislators to raise tax rates. 6 She found robust
evidence that toll rates increased after the adoption of electronic collection. 57
The implication is that legislators were less concerned with political backlash
from toll increases when the method of collection was of low salience.
51. Id.at 1146.
52. Amy Finkelstein, EZ- Tax: Tax Salience and Tax Rates, 124 Q.J. EcoN. 969 (2009).
53. Surely a significant explanation for the lack of salience is the way the funds for tolls on EZ
Pass systems are collected. To use the system, the driver must create an EZ Pass account by purchasing
via credit card a flat amount (such as $25), which is used to pay the tolls that the user incurs. Additional
amounts are reloaded automatically via credit card.
54. In many locations, the amount of the toll is posted or flashes on a monitor before it is paid.
Alternatively, the driver could examine the EZ Pass statement sent to all users. Thus, it cannot be said
that the information is hidden; it is of low salience.
55. For example, when deciding which entrde to order at a restaurant, a consumer who takes
cost into account is likely to choose based on the price for the entr6e listed in the menu even though the
actual price will include tax and tip. Conversely, where the price of the commodity or service is tax-
inclusive-as with parking-garage fees that include local taxes or gasoline prices that include excise
taxes-decisions are likely to be based on the total cost. Online airline and rental-car bookings might be
ripe for study, to compare those cases where the listed fee does not include all taxes with those cases
where it does.
56. See infra Section V.B.
57. Finkelstein, supra note 52, at 1008-09.
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A study by Marika Cabral and Caroline Hoxby that focused on the politics
of property taxes found that property tax rates were higher in areas where
property taxes were less salient. One key way in which property taxes were less
salient was the common method of paying the taxes by tax escrow-the
property tax is paid by the holder of the mortgage and is lumped together with
all payments made to the bank. The study also found that when a state's tax
escrow rises, voters support fewer statewide referenda that limit property taxes.
Conversely, when property taxes are more salient, they are lower and more
likely to be constrained by limits.58
Rupert Sausgruber and Jean-Robert Tyran conducted a laboratory
experiment in which subjects earned income in a game and subsequently voted
on a proposal to tax transactions and redistribute revenues. The tax proposal
was framed as either a tax on consumers or an equivalent tax on sellers. They
showed that the tax was more salient when it was framed as a tax on
consumers.59 Their study found that participants systemically underestimated
the tax burden of the (less salient) tax on sellers and voted for a tax that was not
in their self-interest.
The salience of a tax also may be affected by the form in which the tax is
levied. The way the tax is framed may make it less prominent.60 This is
reflected in the study by Chetty and his coauthors as well as the study by
Finkelstein: in each case, the same tax was levied in two different forms, one of
which was more salient than the other.61 In an empirical study comparing the
effects of state sales tax exemptions and income tax incentives for the purchase.
of hybrid vehicles, Kelly Sims Gallagher and Erich Muehlegger found that a
sales tax incentive resulted in a significantly larger increase in demand for
hybrid vehicles than a comparable income tax incentive. 62 They attributed this
in part to the salience of the sales tax, which was incorporated into the vehicle's
price at the time of purchase, as contrasted to the income tax incentive, which
58. Marika Cabral & Caroline Hoxby, The Hated Property Tax: Salience, Tax Rates, and Tax
Revolts 42 (unpublished manuscript), available at http://economics.stanford.edulfiles/Hoxby3_2.pdf.
59. Rupert Sausgruber & Jean-Robert Tyran, Tax Salience, Voting, and Deliberation 2, 11-13
(Univ. of Copenhagen Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No. 08-21, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=l 292731.
60. Aradhna Krishna & Joel Slemrod, Behavioral Public Finance: Tax Design as Price
Presentation, 10 INT'L TAX & PuB. FIN. 189, 190-91 (2004); McCaffery & Baron, supra note 37, at
290-91. Behavioral responses may vary with the form of the tax even though two taxes are otherwise
equivalent. See, e.g., Tomer Blumkin, Bradley Ruffle & Yosi Ganun, Are Income Taxes and
Consumption Taxes Ever Really Equivalent? Evidence from a Real-Effort Experiment with Real Goods
(Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 5145, 2010), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1667769 (finding different behavioral responses to an otherwise equivalent
income tax and consumption tax in a laboratory experiment).
61. See Chetty et al., supra note 49, at 1158-64; Finkelstein, supra note 52.
62. Kelly Sims Gallagher & Erich Muehlegger, Giving Green To Get Green? Incentives and
Consumer Adoption ofHybrid Vehicle Technology, 61 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 1 (2011).
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was less well understood and would benefit the purchaser, if at all, only in the
following year when a tax return was filed.63
Scholars have just begun to focus on the salience aspects of the income
tax. One focus has been to demonstrate that an income tax is more salient than
other types of taxes. 4 In a series of survey studies, Edward McCaffery and
Jonathan Baron demonstrated that in considering taxes and other fiscal policies,
people tended to focus on the most direct, immediate, and certain effects. 6 One
of their conclusions was that people focused primarily on salient effects of
taxes. They found that "ordinary people seem to have deep-seated tendencies to
form quick judgments on matters of tax and economic policy, responding to the
most obviously salient aspect of a choice or decision set." 66 For example, in
one experiment they compared raising money for insurance by either an income
tax or a payroll or business tax. Despite some attempt to educate subjects on the
redistributive effects of the various taxes, respondents preferred the less salient
payroll and corporate taxes to the more salient income taxes.67
The other empirical work that explores cognitive bias and income taxes
focuses on tax rates. There is some evidence that tax rates are not very salient,
as evidenced by the fact that people are unable to determine their own marginal
tax rates.68 If rates were salient, one would expect earnings to respond to
changes in rates. Such a response might occur at "kink points" in the rate
schedule where marginal tax rates jump. Emmanuel Saez explored that
possibility using annual tax return data for several decades. He first examined
kink points created by the phase-in and phase-out of the EITC. He found that
wage earners did not respond significantly to the EITC incentives created by
the phase-out and phase-in.69 Self-employed individuals showed significant
bunching but only at the first kink point, and the bunching was not consistent.
70
63. The authors also showed that the effect of the income tax incentive was greatest in the
second quarter after tax returns were filed and then declined, which is consistent with a story in which
individuals receive imperfect information about the incentive or are poorly informed about the value of
the incentive. Id. at 2.
64. See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 40, at 1903.
65. McCaffery & Baron, supra note 37.
66. Id. at 300.
67. McCaffery & Baron, supra note II, at 1761-65. The authors refer to this as "hidden tax
bias." For opinion polls showing similar results, see Andrea Louise Campbell & Kimberly J. Morgan,
Financing the Welfare State: Elite Politics and the Decline of the Social Insurance Model in America,
19 STUD. AM POL. DEV. 173, 184-90 tbl.2 (2005).
68. See Edwin T. Fujii & Clifford B. Hawley, On the Accuracy of Tax Perceptions, 70 REv.
ECON. & STAT. 344, 344 (1988) (noting that only 65% of respondents who completed the survey "were
able to provide an estimate of their household's marginal federal income tax rate"). But see id, at 346-47
("Although taxpayers in general underestimate their marginal tax rates, the difference is modest . . .").
69. Emmanuel Saez, Do Tax Filers Bunch at Kink Points? Evidence, Elasticity Estimation,
and Salience Effects, 2 AM. J. ECON. POL'Y 180 (2010). He noted that there are explanations for his
findings that may have little to do with salience: low intensive elasticity of earnings with respect to
marginal tax rates, ignorance of the incentives, inability to adjust labor supply, and inability to misreport
earnings. Id. at 196-97.
70. Id. This may be due to the increased flexibility to adjust labor supply or ease in cheating.
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Saez also examined behavioral responses to kinks in the marginal-tax rate
schedule and found evidence of a behavioral response to the first kink (that is,
from a zero rate to a positive rate) but no evidence of a response at other kink
points. Although Saez offers a number of explanations for his findings, one
relevant possibility is that it is difficult for taxpayers to understand a complex
tax system and the first kink point is "likely to be more salient and easier to
understand than other kink points." 7'
There is some literature indicating that average tax rates are more salient
72than marginal tax rates. As a result, people probably engage in what Jeffrey
Liebman and Richard Zeckhauser call "schmeduling," the act of behaving as if
one were facing a misperceived schedule instead of the actual schedule.73 The
authors found that one variant of this is "ironing," under which an individual
perceives an average rate rather than a marginal rate.7" Apparently, the
individual's actual marginal tax rate is not salient.
Salience also affects the delivery of information to individuals. If a
communication is salient, it may convey information that would change
behavior. Conversely, a nonsalient communication may fail to convey the
necessary information, resulting in no behavioral change. A number of studies
have shown that additional information affects decisionmaking. Chetty and
Saez have added to this literature in the tax area by demonstrating that
providing additional information about the EITC affects labor supply.77 They
view their contribution as "showing that the impacts of tax policies depend on
the way in which individuals are taught about the tax system. One relevant
71. Id. at 211.
72. C.V. Brown, Misconceptions About Income Tax and Incentives, 15 SCOT. J. POL. ECON. I
(1968); Norbert L. Enrick, A Further Study ofIncome Tax Consciousness, 17 NAT'L TAX J. 319 (1964);
Bruce L. Gensemer, Jane A. Lean & William B. Neenan, Awareness of Marginal Income Tax Rates
Among High-Income Taxpayers, 18 NAT'L TAX J. 258 (1965). These are all survey studies that may or
may not reflect the extent to which average tax rates rather than marginal tax rates influence behavior.
73. Jeffrey B. Liebman & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Schmeduling (Oct. 2004) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.hks.harvard.eduljeffreyliebman/schmeduling.pdf
74. Liebman and Zeckhauser's example of ironing is an individual with $80,000 of wages,
who is in a 30% bracket and pays $16,000 of tax, who assumes that his tax rate is 20%, and who will
keep 80% of marginal earnings. Id. at 3. For a similar finding, see Charles A.M. de Bartolome, Which
Tax Rate Do People Use: Average or Marginal?, 56 J. PUB. ECON. 79 (1995). Charles de Bartolome ran
a laboratory experiment in which he tested whether people used average or marginal tax rates in making
investment decisions and found that a significant number used the average rate. He also found that
converting tax tables that simply provided taxes without a marginal rate into a schedule that listed the
marginal rate increased the number of people who used the marginal rate.
75. This may be in part because taxpayers do not have accurate real-time information. Their
marginal tax rate may not be known until year end, and they may use outdated information from a
previous year.
76. See, e.g., Esther Duflo & Emmanuel Saez, The Role ofInformation and Social Interactions
in Retirement Plan Decisions: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment, 118 Q.J. ECON. 815 (2003).
77. Raj Chetty & Emmanuel Saez, Teaching the Tax Code: Earnings Responses to an
Experiment with EITC Recipients (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14836, 2009),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl4836.
78. Id. at 5.
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salience finding was that the information had an effect because it was provided
at the time that the individuals were thinking about taxes.
In sum, current work shows that the salience of a tax may affect economic
decisions, particularly consumption decisions. If the tax is not very salient,
there will be no change in response or less change in response than there would
have been had the tax been more visible. Thus, a taxpayer's pretax and after-tax
responses will be the same. Ordinarily one would expect the existence of a tax
to affect prices and thus demand. With respect to a commodity, a consumer
aware of a tax on the commodity will consume less than in the absence of the
tax. If the consumer is unaware of the existence of a tax, then the tax will not
affect a decision about whether to purchase or the amount to purchase.7 ' In
addition, work with respect to the income tax shows that although the existence
of this tax is highly salient (virtually everyone is aware of it), some aspects of
the income tax-particularly rates-are themselves not very salient.
A caution is in order. Work exploring the relationship of salience to
taxation is quite nascent. It is only recently that scholars have begun to explore
the effect of cognitive biases on taxpayer decisions. Much of this work has
been done in a laboratory setting, and it is entirely possible that taxpayer biases
would produce different results in the real world. Furthermore, several
cognitive biases may operate at once, and another heuristic may trump a
response to salience or may cause it to diminish in importance. Nevertheless,
the basic conclusion-salience affects response to taxation-seems fairly
robust.
B. Why Do People Ignore (or Misperceive) Taxes?
In thinking about exploiting salience in designing taxes, it is helpful to
understand the various heuristics at work. Several cognitive biases may explain
why the increased salience of a tax changes consumer response. If Congress
79. That is not to say that there are no costs. The consumer who incorrectly perceives the cost
of a product where the tax cost is not visible or clear may spend more than she otherwise would on that
product. Given a binding budget constraint, she will necessarily spend less on other products, thus
distorting her choice.
80. There are cognitive biases other than those attributable to availability that may contribute
to the undervaluation or ignorance of taxes. Salience probably does not do all the work. For example, the
presentation or framing of prices may affect consumer decisions. See Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. Bus. S251 (1986). Anchoring bias-
where an individual anchors decisionmaking to a starting point, failing to adjust to new information-
may cause consumers to presume that the final price is closer to the original price (that is, the anchor)
than to some other price. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 45, at 1128. Particularly where
consumers are estimating the tax, they may choose a total sales price closer to the posted tax-exclusive
price than to the tax-inclusive price. It is also probable that taxpayers are unable to combine the effects
of various tax systems, suffering from what McCaffery and Baron call "disaggregation bias." Edward J.
McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The Humpty Dumpty Blues: Disaggregation Bias in the Evaluation of
Tax Systems, 91 ORG. BEHAV. & HuM. DECISION PROCESSES 230 (2003). This is similar to mental
accounting, where individuals account for related items separately. See Richard Thaler, Mental
Accounting Matters, 12 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 183 (1999). Finally, optimism bias, which causes
a person to undervalue negative effects-like taxes-may cause consumers to undervalue the tax. Cf
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were to attempt to use salience as a fiscal tool, it would be helpful to know how
deep-seated biases are and whether they can be easily overcome.
The effects of low-salience taxes might be explained by the "isolation
effect," which is generally understood to mean that individuals pay attention to
information or issues immediately before them and fail to take into account
relevant information that is not immediately available.8 1 This explanation
assumes that people may have the relevant information but ignore it because it
is not immediately available, either because it is not prominent or because there
are costs to obtaining the information. Chetty and his coauthors explain their
findings by theorizing that individuals incur costs when they must calculate the
tax to apply to tax-exclusive prices. 82 They argue that it is possible that
consumers may engage in a kind of cognitive loafing. The existence of the tax
is known, but consumers do not take the time to compute the tax-inclusive price
of a product, perhaps because the utility gained from not doing the calculation
exceeds the savings. Chetty and his coauthors assume rational taxpayers-that
is, taxpayers deliberately ignore the tax to avoid the disutility of computing the
tax as part of the process of weighing their options.83
What might account for this disutility? The most obvious possibility is
that the cost of calculating a tax outweighs the benefit of doing so. Even with
respect to the sales tax on a single purchase, the value of the time to calculate
the total price may outweigh any utility from changing the decision to purchase
due to the small amount of tax. If the cost of calculating the tax (including the
cost of uncovering the information about the tax and calculating the tax owed)
exceeds the cost of ignoring the tax (that is, the amount of the tax), the
consumer will not take the tax into account. But, of course, cognitive biases
may cause the consumer to calculate the tax incorrectly or even to be ignorant
of the need to calculate the tax.
McCaffery and Baron also suggest that taxpayers may ignore "hidden
taxes" because of a combination of the endowment effect and loss aversion.
The endowment effect refers to the finding that people value an object they
own more than an object they do not. Loss aversion refers to the fact that
people consistently are less concerned with failing to gain some amount than
they are with losing that same amount; their reaction to the loss is
disproportionate to the economic loss. This would explain the reaction to taxes
David A. Armor & Shelley E. Taylor, When Predictions Fail: The Dilemma of Unrealistic Optimism, in
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 334 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds.,
2002) (exploring the negative consequences of optimism bias).
81. McCaffery & Baron, supra note 37, at 290; Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron,
Thinking About Tax, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 106, 107 (2006).
82. Chetty et al., supra note 49, at 1149 n.6; Raj Chetty, Adam Looney & Kory Kroft,
Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence 28-35 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 13330, 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl3330.
83. Chetty et al., supra note 82, at 32. Brian Galle calls this an "intentional model of 'hidden
taxes."' Galle, supra note 2, at 63.
84. McCaffery & Baron, supra note 37, at 290.
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that are less visible because the incidence is unknown-for example, the
employer's contribution to Social Security or corporate taxes--since the
taxpayer does not believe that she is losing something that belonged to her.85
The tax is not directly paid by the taxpayer, and thus, there is no aversion to
losing what she owns.86
Another possibility is strategic ignorance. While taxpayers subconsciously
know about a tax, they may avoid taking it into account because they know that
it might in fact affect their behavior in ways that they would not like.8 7
Inattention may also be attributable to complexity-if a law or provision is
extremely complex, one would expect the salience of the law or provision to
decrease. Or a consumer may be unable to compute the tax, and if so, simply
ignore it. Another possibility is that taxpayers actually are ignorant of a tax and
thus fail to take it into account.89 There are a number of possible explanations
for this ignorance. People may simply be unaware of the tax. While it is
unlikely that individuals are unaware of the existence of, say, a sales tax or an
income tax, they may be unfamiliar with the details or various provisions.
There are other taxes, however, of which they may be totally unaware-such as
the corporate tax or various excise taxes-or at least unaware that the incidence
of the tax might fall on them.90
III. Salience and Taxes
A. Two Kinds of Salience
Although the literature with respect to salience generally refers to salience
as a single type of bias or heuristic causing behavioral responses, it is useful to
distinguish between two types of salience. The first behavioral response is a
change in individual economic decisionmaking, and this Article refers to the
salience that provokes that response as "economic salience." The second is a
political response to government action, and this Article refers to the salience
that provokes that response as "political salience." A tax or a tax provision may
85. Id. at 289-90.
86. Id. at 290; see also McCaffery & Baron, supra note 81, at 119 (observing that taxpayers
"do not seem to think this far or this many steps ahead").
87. See Juan D. Carrillo & Thomas Mariotti, Strategic Ignorance as a Self-Disciplining
Device, 67 REv. ECON. STUD. 529, 529 (2000).
88. See Raj Chetty, The Simple Economics ofSalience and Taxation I (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 15246, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/wl5246 (noting that
inattention to taxes may be prevalent "because tax systems are complex and nontransparent").
89. These taxpayers might be said to be "irrational" in that they do not maximize welfare.
Galle calls this an "unintentional" model of hidden taxes. Galle, supra note 2, at 64.
90. For a suggestion that the corporate tax is a politically expedient way to raise revenue
because its incidence is not understood, see Peter H. Aranson, The Multiple Tax on Corporate Income
45 (Int'l Inst. for Econ. Research, Original Paper No. 71977, 1977). But see Arlen & Weiss, supra note
38, at 332 (noting problems with the argument).
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elicit either or both responses. This Section briefly describes both types of
salience.
As noted above, most of the empirical work with respect to salience and
taxation has examined economic salience and has focused primarily on sales
taxes or excise taxes. Economic salience refers to the way in which economic
responses or decisionmaking varies with the salience of a tax or a tax provision.
The higher the salience, the more pronounced the change in economic
behavior. This has been shown to occur with respect to consumption taxes
(retail sales taxes and excise taxes). Changes in economic decisionmaking as a
result of the imposition of or change in an income tax are less certain. Although
the income tax is a very prominent tax, the extent to which it changes economic
behavior is less clear. We might assume that if taxpayers were aware of and
correctly understood their tax burden, they might supply a different amount of
labor than they would in the absence of the tax-much as consumers acquire
fewer or different goods in response to a commodity tax. Although it seems
likely that laborers would respond in some way to the tax burden, in reality, we
cannot be sure of the exact response. This is because it is unlikely that
taxpayers accurately assess their tax burden, and because labor supply is more
inelastic than consumption purchases.
The second type of behavioral response relies on political salience. This is
the political reaction from the electorate in response to the adoption of a tax or
tax provision-it might range from rejection to acceptance or, importantly,
perhaps no response at all. Although little empirical work has been done to
gauge the effect of salience on political response, we can extrapolate from the
work on economic salience to infer that the political response to various tax
provisions should vary with their salience.91 We would expect a more sustained
political response to a salient tax or provision, either in support or in protest.92
Conversely, there would be less response to a low-salience provision. As
contrasted with economic salience, which affects taxpayers directly, political
salience elicits a response that is directed at legislators and is intended to affect
tax policy. It is assumed that legislators will react to an anticipated or actual
political response.93 Thus, the viability or acceptance of a tax provision may
91. Although that is what is expected, it is not entirely clear that citizens will protest salient
taxes and accept less visible taxes. It is common in the literature to assert that the more visible the tax,
the more likely it is that it will be the subject of a protest. But limited empirical data seems to indicate
that other factors may predominate. Isaac Martin & Nadav Gabay, Do Visible Taxes Cause Protest? Tax
Policy and Tax Protest in Rich Democracies (Aug. 2, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.mediafire.com/?zrcjoy6hbam.
92. See Richard M. Bird, Visibility and Accountability: Is Tax-Inclusive Pricing a Good
Thing?, 58 CAN. TAX J. 63, 65 (2010), available at
https://www.ctf.ca/ctfwebfDocuments/PDF/20Octj/10ctjl-bird.pdf (noting that "from a political
perspective, people tend to react primarily to the taxes of which they are most aware"); Sausgruber &
Tyran, supra note 59 (finding in a laboratory experiment that salience affects bias voting on commodity
taxes).
93. The Canadian experience with the introduction of a highly visible Goods and Services Tax
("GST"), which replaced a much less visible federal-sales tax, is instructive. The low initial rate was
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depend on the political response, which will be influenced by the salience of
the provision. For example, a government that was interested in increasing
taxes (or revenue) in an environment where that was politically challenging
could exploit the availability bias by consciously adopting a low-salience tax
provision. Or a political party that wanted to highlight a tax increase proposed
by the other party would favor framing it in a salient way so that its prominence
would attract attention and perhaps opposition.
Distinguishing between these two types of salience is very helpful in
clearing up a recurring confusion about salience and taxes that is best illustrated
by a VAT. A VAT sometimes is said to be quite salient.9 4 That would be true
when consumers' consumption decisions change due to the presence of the tax.
If a price is VAT-inclusive, 95 consumers are likely to reduce demand for a
product subject to the VAT because they will react to the higher price. By
contrast, if the price is tax-exclusive (as with many retail sales taxes),
consumption decisions should be affected less. In this respect, it would be
correct to say that a tax-inclusive VAT has high economic salience because it
affects economic behavior. A VAT, however, sometimes is said to be less
salient (than, for example, retail sales taxes) 96 even when it is tax-inclusive.
That is because if the tax is built into the price, it is less obvious and voters will
notice it less, producing a smaller political response. In this respect, it would be
correct to say that a tax-inclusive VAT has low political salience because it
evokes less political response.
A particular tax or tax provision may cause both types of responses, and
these responses may or may not move in the same direction. The table below
illustrates four examples:97
reduced twice after adoption due to the hue and cry that accompanied the GST. This was attributed to its
visibility and the fact that retailers refused to accept a tax-inclusive pricing option. For the history, see
Bird, supra note 92, at 67-69. For somewhat similar stories in other countries, see RICHARD ECCLESTON,
TAXING REFORMS: THE POLITICS OF THE CONSUMPTION TAX IN JAPAN, THE UNITED STATES, CANADA
AND AUSTRALIA (2007).
94. Cf Janjala Chirakijja et al., The Stimulus Effect of the 2008 UK Temporary Vat Cut 6, 10,
12 (Nov. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.eprg.org.uk/faculty/crossley/research/NTA volume VATcut.pdf (discussing the salience of
the VAT when prices are and are not tax-inclusive).
95. The European Union, for example, requires that prices be tax-inclusive. See Council
Directive 98/6, art. 2, 1998 O.J. (L 80) 27 (EC).
96. See, e.g., Tony Cookson, Should a Government Hide Its Taxes?, THIS YOUNG ECONOMIST
(Nov. 4, 2009, 7:30 AM), http://blog.thisyoungeconomist.com/2009/1 I/should-government-hide-its-
taxes.html (noting that "a value added tax" is "essentially a consumption tax that requires no math at
transaction time" and "is less salient" than a retail sales tax); James Pethokoukis, VAT Attack! Another
Reason It Is a Bad Idea, REUTERS BREAKINGVIEWS (Oct. 28, 2009, 2:36 PM),
http://blogs.reuters.com/james-pethokoukis/2009/10/28/vat-attack-another-reason-it-is-a-bad-idea/
(decrying "the hidden nature of a VAT").
97. This table is intended to be illustrative. Insufficient work with respect to the economic
salience of the income tax or various provisions has been done to definitively conclude that the Personal
Exemption Phaseout ("PEP") and Pease provisions would not affect economic decisionmaking. Cf
I.R.C. § 68 (2006) (Pease provision-reducing the allowable amount of itemized deductions for
taxpayers whose incomes exceed a statutory threshold); id. § 151(d)(3) (PEP provision-reducing the
personal exemption for taxpayers whose incomes exceed a statutory threshold). Nevertheless, it seems
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Low Political Salience High Political Salience
Low Economic PEP and Pease Retail Sales Tax
Salience Provisions
High Economic Tax-Inclusive VAT Marginal Income Tax
Salience Rates
B. Examples of Salience
The application of salience to taxes may manifest itself in a variety of
ways that affect economic or political salience. It is useful to catalogue some of
them.
First, many people who pay a tax may be completely unaware of the tax.
Excise taxes on various commodities, which generally are incorporated into the
price, are largely unknown. So too are many business-level taxes, such as
manufacturers' excise taxes.
Second, individuals may be aware of a tax but unsure of its base. For
example, taxpayers may be cognizant of gasoline taxes but unaware of which
fuels are subject to them. Or they may be familiar with Social Security taxes
but do not know if they apply to fringe benefits as well as wages.
Third, individuals may be aware of the tax but not its incidence. 98 The
structure of the tax affects its salience. For example, both the corporate tax and
the payroll tax have low salience for owners and workers because the incidence
of the tax is either unknown or not prominent. It is widely believed that the
incidence of the corporate tax falls in part on both shareholders and consumers,
but the exact degree to which each group bears a burden is controversial. 99
Perhaps more important for this purpose, one would assume that the
overwhelming majority of consumers and owners are unaware that they may
share the burden of the corporate tax. If so, their behavioral response to the tax
might be different than it would be if the exact incidence were known and
likely that these income tax phase-outs would have little effect on labor supply. Although somewhat
more work has been done with respect to marginal income tax rates, this category is only intended to
suggest, rather than to conclude, that they might have a significant effect on labor or consumption
decisions.
98. The incidence ofa tax may not be clear because the tax may cause price changes that shift
the burden from the person who remits tax to the government to someone else. An individual may
believe that the payor of the tax bears its burden rather than the person with the actual burden.
99. See, e.g., William A. Klein, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax: A Lawyer's
View of a Problem in Economics, 1965 WIS. L. REV. 576, 602 (concluding that "the question of
incidence [of the corporate tax] is wholly unanswerable"); see also Alan J. Auerbach, Who Bears the
Corporate Tax? A Review of What We Know, 20 TAx POL'Y & ECON. 1, 3 (2006) (noting that "the
ultimate incidence of the [corporate] tax remains somewhat unresolved," although "there have been
many advances over the years in our thinking about how to assign the corporate tax burden").
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understood. Similarly, many workers are unaware that they bear the burden of
both portions of Social Security taxes because the employer's share is passed
on to the employee.
Fourth, individuals may be aware of the tax but not know how much tax
they pay. The way in which the tax is levied affects salience-the amount of
the tax is much less prominent when it is included in a tax-inclusive price than
when it is added at the cash register. An excise tax bundled into the advertised
price may be difficult to ferret out.
Fifth, individuals may be very aware of a tax and have lots of information
about the tax but be unable to calculate their own tax burden, either because
they have imperfect knowledge about the rate or the base or because it is too
complex. For example, they may confuse marginal rates with average or
effective rates.
Sixth, interaction between various provisions may obscure their effects.
For example, the top nominal marginal tax rate is quite salient but often does
not apply because other provisions, such as income ceilings, rate bubbles, and
phase-outs, have the effect of increasing the rate.
Seventh, the consequences of tax provisions also may be masked by other
provisions that cut in the opposite direction or by direct spending that
counteracts taxation. For example, Congress could heavily tax an industry
nominally and at the same time provide tax incentives or direct spending so that
the total burden on the industry is of low salience.
Eighth, individuals may not understand the economic effect of a "tax"
because it is implicit rather than explicit. For example, where the tax exemption
for municipal bonds is fully capitalized into their price (the pretax income is
reduced by the statutory tax rate), the holder bears an implicit tax that is never
labeled as such.
Ninth, the method of payment of a tax affects its salience. Paying the tax
in small, incremental amounts may make the details of the tax far less visible
than making a large lump sum payment. Payment of a property tax annually or
even quarterly by check makes it more visible, whereas using a tax escrow
arrangement in connection with a mortgage makes it less so.loo
Because the economic salience of income tax provisions is not well
understood, and because the thrust of this Article's argument is based on
political salience, it is useful to highlight the fact that the current income tax
law already contains a number of provisions with low political salience. 101
100. See Cabral & Hoxby, supra note 58.
101. There are of course high-salience provisions in the Internal Revenue Code, and there may
be occasions where they are warranted. Low-salience taxes or provisions would be counterproductive
with respect to Pigouvian taxes that are intended to change behavior. If Congress wants taxpayers to use
incentives, it needs to call attention to the benefit. Congress has designed certain provisions in the Code
to be more prominent or salient. For example, at one time, the standard deduction and exemption were
incorporated into a "zero bracket amount" that was built into the tax tables. Apparently, many taxpayers
believed that they had lost those tax benefits because they had been obscured in the calculation of taxes
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There is some evidence that Congress has intentionally designed them with that
in mind. These provisions may be of low visibility because they were passed
without much fanfare, were not highlighted by the administrative agency
administering the provision, and have received little media attention.
For example, withholding on wages is a low-salience way of collecting
taxes because wage earners do not make payments directly to the government
and usually only observe and receive net pay. Withholding also utilizes several
other cognitive biases, such as loss aversionl02 and easing the burden of
economic decisionmaking.103 Although observant wage holders may find the
tax quite visible because there is evidence of the tax on every pay stub, 10
payments are made in small, incremental amounts, and their impact is therefore
muted.
There also are numerous provisions that have the effect of masking rate
increases, and there is some evidence that they were adopted for that reason
because directly raising rates was not politically possible. Two examples are
the so-called PEP and Pease provisions. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1990105 increased the effective tax rate for certain taxpayers, but it did
not do so directly. Instead, it reduced itemized deductions for high-income
taxpayers. Section 68 reduced certain itemized deductions by three cents for
each dollar of the amount of adjusted gross income ("AGI") that exceeded an
applicable amount.106 For each dollar AGI increased, taxable income went up
by the dollar plus three cents of eliminated deductions. For those taxpayers
with AGI exceeding the applicable amount, their effective tax rate was 1.03
times the statutory rate. For example, a taxpayer in the top 35% bracket had her
owed. Congress returned to the more salient presentation of those benefits by having taxpayers actually
deduct the standard deduction and exemption in calculating taxable income. For another example, see
Joel Slemrod, Buenas Notches: Lines and Notches in Tax System Design 21 (Apr. 8, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript), available at
http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm-dlvl/groups/public/@nyulaw website academics colloquiatax_
policy/documents/documents/ecm_ pro_065390.pdf ("It may be that notches get people's attention in
ways that smooth or kinked programs do not, so that they may be more effective in influencing
behavior."). Notches occur when an incremental change in income or expense causes a discrete change
in income, deductions, or credits. Congress could design an incentive provision to be of low-salience if
it did not actually want to encourage use of the benefit or wanted to limit the revenue cost. In some
cases, it appears that Congress intended to provide incentives but designed them in such a way that they
are not very salient and are underutilized. See, e.g., Deborah H. Schenk & Andrew J. Grossman, The
Failure of Tax Incentives for Education, 61 TAX L. REv. 440 (2008). A more complete discussion of
how exploiting the salience bias might be used in connection with tax expenditures is the subject of a
forthcoming paper. See Deborah H. Schenk, Using Cognitive Biases To Curb Tax Expenditures (2011)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
102. Withholding may take advantage of loss aversion because wage earners do not make
payments to the government, and therefore, are likely to assume that the portion representing withheld
taxes was not theirs.
103. Martin & Gabay, supra note 91, at 5.
104. See Gary S. Becker & Casey B. Mulligan, Deadweight Costs and the Size ofGovernment,
46 J.L. & ECON. 293 (2003).
105. Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12,
19, 20, 26, 29,30 and 42 U.S.C.).
106. Id. § 11103 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 68 (2006)).
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tax rate increased by slightly over one percentage point on the amount of
additional income, for a total tax rate on that income of 36%. This is exactly the
same as if Congress had raised the rate one percentage point. That of course
would have been much simpler, but at the time it was also politically difficult
to do. Thus, Congress intentionally raised the effective tax rate without raising
the nominal rate.107 This is also true of the personal exemption haircut. os The
intention was to increase the effective tax rate for wealthier taxpayers without
changing the top marginal rate.i0
An earlier example of this was found in the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
which imposed a 5% surcharge on certain middle-income taxpayers to phase
out the benefits of lower brackets. This effectively created a higher bracket that
for some taxpayers was wedged in the apparent top bracket. This enabled
Congress to assert that the top marginal tax bracket was lower than it actually
110was.
On a broader level, all phase-outs can be seen as a form of adjusting
marginal rates without actually changing the nominal rates. They serve another
purpose as well. When Congress phases out or imposes caps on deductions, it is
still able to retain the deduction even though it has become far less valuable.
For example, limiting the deduction for business meals and entertainment to
50% of the cost"'1 leaves the deduction in place but effectively raises the tax
rate on all those who incur the costs. There is no change, however, in the
marginal rate schedule.112
A failure to index rate brackets for inflation also has the effect of
changing the top marginal rate for many taxpayers without making any changes
in the rate brackets, assuming income increases with inflation. In periods of
inflation, taxpayers will move up the rate brackets-and thus, their taxes will
increase-even though their purchasing power has remained steady. 113 This tax
"increase" has almost no salience because its source is not obvious. It takes a
fairly savvy taxpayer to understand that an increase in inflation will have this
effect. And, perhaps more importantly, it is not directly traceable to Congress-
the failure to address inflation is not a specific act that is likely to become the
107. Steuerle & Sullivan, supra note 38, at 407.
108. I.R.C. § 151(d)(3).
109. Steuerle & Sullivan, supra note 38, at 407 ("In reality, it was designed mainly to increase
tax rates-but without the increase being so obvious as to be reflected in the formal rate schedule.").
110. For example, the Joint Committee explanation of the bill noted that there would be only
two brackets, 15% and 28%, failing to mention the 33% bracket created by the rate bubble. STAFF OF
THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF
1986, at 20-21 (1987).
111. I.R.C. § 274(n).
112. These "backdoor" ways of increasing tax rates have been subject to withering criticism.
See AM. BAR ASS'N SECTION OF TAXATION, REPORT TO THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES (1999),
available at http://www.abanet.org/tax/pubpolicy/resolutions/subl51d3.html (advocating repeal of the
PEP and Pease provisions and calling for explicit rate adjustments as a more transparent approach);
McCaffery, supra note 40, at 1900-01.
113. See McCaffery, supra note 40, at 1893-97.
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focus of political debate. This remained true until the 1970s when inflation
became so insistent that there was a call to deal with what was referred to as
inflation creep. The 1981 Tax Act indexed rate brackets, but it was not fully
implemented until 1989.114 At that point, the salience of inflation overpowered
the low salience of inflation creep, although that has reversed in recent years.1
Another way to adjust the rates without doing so directly is to adjust
downwards the income subject to a higher rate bracket. Even if a taxpayer does
not change rate brackets, the extra income will be taxed at her marginal tax
rate, increasing the effective tax.
Perhaps one of the most important ways Congress has devised to increase
revenue with low political salience is the alternative minimum tax ("AMT").
The original purpose of the AMT was to ensure that high-income individuals
paid at least some income tax and to increase the effective tax rate on high-
income individuals.1 6 AIT is calculated by determining alternative minimum
taxable income ("AMTI")' 17 and reducing it by phased-out exemption amounts
to calculate the taxable excess, on which the tax is levied." 8 If the tentative
minimum tax is greater than the regular tax, the taxpayer owes the
difference.' Once the AMT is taken into account, actual marginal tax rates are
no longer very salient due largely to the complexity of the statutory
provisions.120 Because of the interaction of the AMT with the regular tax rate
schedule, as well as the fact that the AMT base and regular base differ, it is
difficult for taxpayers to determine their actual marginal rate.121
114. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 104(a), 95 Stat. 172, 188
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1(f); see also Rev. Proc. 88-56, 1988-2 C.B. 726 ("Starting with
taxable years beginning in 1989, both the tax rate tables and the standard deduction amounts are subject
to an inflation adjustment based on a prescribed method.").
115. On the decreasing salience of inflation, see, for example, Janet L. Yellen, President &
CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F., Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Conference on the
Implications of Behavioral Economics for Economic Policy: Implications of Behavioral Economics for
Monetary Policy 7 (Sept. 28, 2007), available at http://www.frbsf.org/news/speeches/2007/0928.pdf.
116. Congress was outraged by 154 individuals with incomes of over $200,000 who paid no
tax in 1966. H.R. REP. No. 91-413, at 1 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1645. In addition,
many individuals with high incomes were paying tax at a relatively low effective rate due to a variety of
tax preferences, even to the point where the tax rates were regressive at the top end. STAFFS OF THE
JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION & THE COMM. ON FIN., 91ST CONG., SUMMARY OF
H.R. 13270, THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 47 (1969).
117. AMTI is calculated by adjusting income according to I.R.C. §§ 56 and 58, and adding the
tax-preference items in § 57.
118. I.R.C. § 55(a). The tentative minimum tax equals (1) 26% of taxable excess less than
$175,000, plus (2) 28% of taxable excess greater than $175,000. Id. § 55(b).
119. Id. § 55(a). There are four current effective AMT rates (due to phase-out of the
exemption), which are 26%, 28%, 32.5%, and 35%. Once the phase-out range is passed, the marginal
tax rate is 28%. Id. § 55(b)(1)(A)(i)(II).
120. Williams, supra note 30 (noting that complexity causes a reduction in tax awareness and
using the AMT as an example).
121. See Linda M. Beale, Congress Fiddles While Middle America Burns: Amending the AMT
(and Regular Tax), 6 FLA. TAX REV. 811, 824-25 (2004) (criticizing the AMT for this feature); Leonard
E. Burman, William G. Gale & Jeffrey Rohaly, The AMT: Projections and Problems, 100 TAX NOTES
105, 116 (2003) (same).
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The economic salience of the AMT is somewhat ambiguous. It is likely
that many taxpayers ignore the AMT calculus in making decisions in which
they take their marg*nal tax rate into account (assuming tax rates affect
economic behavior).1 2 On the other hand, the political salience of the AMT has
been quite low. It is the nominal marginal tax rates that are a regular part of
political discourse. In fact, it is the highest rate that garners all the attention-
virtually no attention is paid to the other rate brackets. Furthermore, the
aversion to "raising taxes" almost entirely focuses on changes in the rate
brackets, ignoring the possibility that other changes-such as adjustments to
the base-are equivalent ways to raise taxes. Thus, what is salient is the top
nominal marginal rate. Other marginal rates and an individual's actual marginal
rate have low political salience.123 Therefore, the focus on the top marginal rate
bracket, with high political salience, permits Congress to effectively increase
tax rates by using provisions with low political salience, like the AMT.
The low salience of the AMT does not occur because the tax is hidden or
people are unaware of it.124 Politicians have done a good job of making people
understand that it exists-largely through trumpeting their success in curbing
its growth. But the details and, specifically, the effect on marginal tax rates, are
almost completely ignored. It is the effect of the AMT, rather than the tax itself,
that has low salience. Many people do not know if the AMT applies to them.
But more importantly, even if they know that they may be subject to the AMT,
they are unaware of how it specifically affects their tax burden. For example,
someone who is in the 24% marginal tax bracket for the regular tax may
believe that 24% is her marginal rate even though the actual marginal rate may
be higher due to the AMT.125 Thus, taxpayers' political response does not
change in the way that it might if they were aware of their actual marginal rate,
and any revenue that the government might lose from changing the nominal
rate brackets is retained.
122. This is probably a good example of "schmeduling." See Liebman & Zeckhauser, supra
note 73. Liebman and Zeckhauser argue that one of the conditions that gives rise to schmeduling is
complexity and give schedule complexity as an example, by which they mean "when there are more
rates in the schedule or two or more schedules operate simultaneously." Id. at 4.
123. Many taxpayers are confused about the difference between marginal rates and effective
or average rates; even if they know in which rate bracket they fall, they mistakenly believe that all
income is taxed at one rate. Or they may believe that all income is taxed at the average rate. The AMT
further confuses this because it is difficult for individuals to calculate the highest marginal tax rate or
their own individual marginal tax rate. An added low-salience feature of the AMT is that it breaks the
taxes into multiple pieces, making each piece less salient than the total.
124. The "acceptance" of the AMT may be a result of multiple cognitive biases. For example,
individuals may be unable to aggregate the regular tax with the AMT-partitioning the total tax bill into
two parts may cause taxpayers to underestimate their actual tax burden. Anchoring bias may also do
some of the work. Taxpayers are likely to anchor their estimate of tax burdens in the regular tax with its
well-known marginal tax rates and be unable to adjust even when presented with additional information.
125. It is extremely difficult to determine the actual marginal rate in advance if the taxpayer is
subject to the AMT. This is largely because of various phase-outs, such as the exemption amount. If the
rate cannot be determined until the tax return is filed, it is the perceived marginal rate rather than the
actual marginal rate that will affect behavior.
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IV. Salience as a Fiscal Policy Tool
A. The Argument and Examples
Generally, commentators assume that cognitive biases lead to poor
decisionmaking, inefficiencies, and other problems (catalogued below) and that
either public or private correctives are in order.126 The consensus is that
legislators should not take advantage of cognitive biases in designing taxes.127
This Article argues, however, that there are circumstances where it is
appropriate for legislators to do so.128 The main argument that this Article
makes is a political-economy argument-namely, it is appropriate to exploit
political salience. Before laying out the argument, this Section considers
whether there is an efficiency case for exploiting economic salience.
126. See, e.g., McCaffery &Baron, supra note 81, at 110, 127-28. McCaffery and Baron argue
that "hidden taxes" will cause citizens to underreact to a loss of the money taken by such taxes, which
will ultimately lead to less utility and a loss of wealth. They also note that the so-called "flypaper effect"
will cause hidden taxes to stick, raising new revenue rather than replacing other sources of revenue. For
further discussion of the "flypaper effect," see James R. Hines Jr. & Richard Thaler, The Flypaper
Effect, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 217 (1995). But see Elizabeth Becker, The Illusion of Fiscal Illusion:
Unsticking the Flypaper Effect, 86 PUB. CHOICE 85, 86 (1996) (finding "no evidence of irrational
behavior" that would support the flypaper-effect hypothesis). McCaffery and Baron recommend
education (debiasing), political constraints (for example, PAYGO), and structural reform (for example,
competition in tax design). McCaffery & Baron, supra note 81, at 129-32.
127. Some commentators directly reject the possibility. See Leo P. Martinez, Tax Legislation
and Democratic Discourse: The Rhetoric ofRevenue and Politics, 4 NEv. L.J. 510, 516 (2003) (arguing
that "the resort to taxes that are not on the public's radar screen . . . can only delay what will inevitably
be a rebellion against these heretofore 'silent taxes'); McCaffery, supra note 40, at 1931, 1943 (calling
the use of cognitive biases "tricks" and the approach "fraught with dangers" and "run[ning] afoul of
basic moral notions" and stating that the author is "uneasy at the prospect of exploiting cognitive error
as a general approach"). Others use terminology that makes it clear that they think it is a bad idea. See,
e.g., Congdon et al., supra note 38, at 6 (raising the possibility that policymakers could affect welfare
outcomes by "deliberately manipulating tax salience"); Tino Sanandaji & Bjorn Wallace, Fiscal Illusion
and Fiscal Obfuscation: An Empirical Study of Tax Perception in Sweden (Research Inst. of Indus.
Econ., IFN Working Paper No. 837, 2010), available at http://www.ifn.se/wfiles/wp/wp837.pdf (coining
the term "fiscal obfuscation" and noting that "[o]bfuscation relates to the politicians exploiting the
public's rational ignorance by hiding information from them through indirect policies"); Ted Gayer,
Behavioral Economics and the Conservative Critique of VAT, TAXVoX (Oct. 28, 2009, 1:23 PM),
http://taxvox.taxpolicycenter.org/blog/_archives/2009/10/28/4364151.html ("[T]he risk is that
policymakers will use these insights [of behavioral economics] to deliberately temper healthy economic
and political constraints on the growth of government."). Aradhna Krishna and Joel Slemrod raise the
normative issue but do not clearly take a position. Krishna & Slemrod, supra note 60, at 198-99.
Generally, commentators also assume that increased salience is beneficial. See, e.g., Susan
Cleary Morse, Using Salience and Influence To Narrow the Tax Gap, LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 483, 500 (2009)
(offering proposals to make communications from the IRS more salient-that is, relevant, prominent
and accessible-to close the tax gap).
128. For other largely undeveloped suggestions that it might be acceptable to deliberately
employ low-salience taxes, see Galle, supra note 2, at 98 ("[W]e might employ hidden taxes only at the
federal level. . . . Using only national-level hidden taxes would thus avoid a number of the allocational
distortions . . . ."); Steven M. Sheffrin, What Does the Public Believe About Tax Fairness?, 45 NAT'L
TAX J. 301, 306 (1993) (noting that "there may be scope for using their characteristic biases in the name
of good tax policy"); and Williams, supra note 30 (suggesting that masking taxes may help to raise
revenue in a relatively efficient way).
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Those who have considered the possibility that exploiting the salience bias
may be efficiency-enhancing have done so in the context of consumption
taxes.129 The basic argument is that if individuals are unaware of a tax, it cannot
change their pretax behavior. Usually a behavioral response reduces the
efficiency with which resources are used, decreases output, and diminishes
utility. It is often suggested that efficiency costs can be reduced by imposing
taxes on inelastic goods or behavior because price is less important or
irrelevant. If individuals are unaware of or ignore low-salience taxes, and thus,
the taxes operate in the same way as a tax on highly inelastic behavior, they
might be relatively efficient because they would not affect the behavior of
actors. Under this view, low-salience taxes might be said to promote
efficiency.13 0
With respect to consumption taxes, however, there are offsetting
considerations that make efficiency gains uncertain. Distortions created by
taxes may be magnified with low-salience taxes because taxpayers will not
make consumption decisions with correct information. If individuals are
confused rather than ignorant about taxes, there may be no efficiency
advantage. For example, if individuals were not sure there was a tax, they
might act as if a tax were imposed whether there was a tax or not. If consumers
were unaware of the tax, they would incorrectly calculate prices and thus might
consume more of the goods subject to the tax. With a binding budget
constraint, they would consume less of other goods, thus distorting choice."' If
consumers were unable to calculate the amount of the tax, they might assume a
larger or smaller price adjustment than actually occurs. Thus, the efficiency
effects of decreasing salience with respect of consumption taxes are
ambiguous.
The efficiency gains from the use of low-salience income tax provisions
are somewhat less ambiguous. As noted above, almost all consumers will be
aware of the income tax, so the possibility that there are efficiency gains
because of ignorance of the tax itself does not hold. Furthermore, individuals
will not be subject to a binding budget constraint since income is not fixed. The
efficiency effects with respect to the income tax depend on the extent to which
taxpayers alter their economic decisions in response to the tax. The empirical
129. See Galle, supra note 2, at 62; Congdon et al., supra note 38, at 8; Nussim, supra note 38.
130. Galle suggests but does not wholly support the idea that such taxes may be a desirable
feature ofa tax system because they are efficient. His specific policy prescription is that "hidden" taxes
are likely to be welfare-increasing on goods for which demand is inelastic, and welfare losses that result
from transfers from poorer consumers to richer consumers can be minimized by using hidden taxes in
markets where those who benefit from a hidden tax are no wealthier than those who might lose welfare.
Galle, supra note 2, at 62.
131. See Congdon et al., supra note 38, at 8. William Congdon, Jeffrey Kling, and Sendhil
Mullainathan note that taxes that are hidden from taxpayers will keep elasticity low; if there is a binding
budget constraint, spending more on the item with the low-salience tax leaves less income for other
purchases and thus distorts consumption and decreases welfare. They conclude that the net
consequences are not clear.
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evidence on that issue is mixed. While theoretically wage earners should adjust
their labor supply in response to taxes, it is not clear whether that actually
occurs or the extent to which it occurs. Many factors make it very difficult to
determine the degree to which a change in tax affects the supply and demand
for labor.132 They include labor elasticities (which vary by gender and marital
status' 33 ), the type of work offered, decisions about education and training, the
selection of an occupation, and the interaction of the income and substitution
effects. If we assume that labor supply would decrease with a tax increase, we
might assume that a low-salience income tax provision would result in less of a
decrease (and a provision with no salience might result in no decrease). If so,
such a provision would be efficiency-enhancing. If labor supply were not
affected by tax changes, a low-salience provision would not increase
efficiency; conversely, however, it would not decrease efficiency.
The degree to which a low-salience tax provision is efficiency-enhancing
is even more complicated because we do not know how much a tax change
affects labor supply. That is dependent on a number of factors. One important
factor is that many wage earners likely cannot correctly calculate their income
tax burden.134 The tax burden they calculate may affect their choice of the mix
between labor and leisure. If individuals assume that they owe more in taxes
than they do (because, for example, they incorrectly assume that the marginal
rate applies to every dollar earned or because they assume they are in the top
(salient) bracket when they are not), they may undersupply labor. Under this
view, if decreasing distortion with respect to taxes is desirable, salience is
required. Conversely, there may be efficiency benefits to be gained where
individuals are unaware of their marginal tax rates and instead use average
rates.135 Because average rates are lower than marginal rates, individuals would
supply more labor than they would if confronted with the actual marginal rate,
decreasing excess burden.
132. For an excellent review of the empirical literature and the reasons the conclusions are
tentative, see CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, LABOR SUPPLY AND TAXES (1996), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/33xx/doc3372/labormkts.pdf. See also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECT
OF TAX CHANGES ON LABOR SUPPLY IN CBO's MICROSIMULATION TAX MODEL 1 (2007), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/79xx/doc7996/04-12-LaborSupply.pdf (noting the limits of models that
estimate the effect of taxes on labor supply and demand).
133. See generally Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, Changes in the Labor Supply
Behavior of Married Women: 1980-2000, 25 J. LABOR ECON. 393, 395 (2007) (noting that married
women have historically exhibited higher wage elasticities than their husbands, although the gap has
narrowed in the past several decades).
134. See Kotlikoff & Rapson, supra note 42, at 1.
135. The authors of two papers that assert that many individuals make economic decisions
based on average rather than marginal tax rates both make the claim that this may improve welfare.
Because average rates are lower than marginal rates, individuals supply more labor than they would if
confronted with the actual marginal rate, decreasing excess burden. See de Bartolome, supra note 74, at
82; Liebman & Zeckhauser, supra note 73, at 26. De Bartolome appears to support the use of the
misperception. See de Bartolome, supra note 74, at 82 ("Maintaining the misperception is good public
policy."); see also Naomi Feldman & Peter Katugik, Should the Average Tax Rate Be Marginalized?
(Ctr. for Econ. Research & Graduate Educ.-Econ. Inst., Working Paper No. 304, 2006), available at
http://195.113.12.58/pdf/wp/Wp304.pdf (noting welfare gains from the misperception of rates).
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While it seems likely that a low-salience income tax provision would
increase efficiency more than a low-salience consumption tax provision, the
conclusion that a low-salience income tax provision is efficiency-enhancing is
not sufficiently robust to be the sole support for intentionally exploiting the
salience bias.
A much stronger case can be made for intentionally exploiting political
salience. There are circumstances where Congress should take advantage of the
cognitive bias created by salience as a fiscal tool for political-economy
reasons. Assuming that the state has the power to levy taxes and an
appropriate need for revenue, it is proper for it to choose a form that is most
palatable to its citizens. In other words, low-salience taxes may serve other,
more important goals. This is an instrumentalist argument-exploiting the
salience bias may achieve an important end.
There is a strong relationship between tax salience and political support
for taxation. Salience affects the politics of taxation. It is foolish and
counterproductive to divorce taxation from politics. Accepting both that the
citizenry wants public goods (and perhaps, redistribution) and that they abhor
taxation,137 it is appropriate for the government to use fiscal tools that can
accomplish the revenue goal with the least pain and most acceptance.
While we might presume that this will be in the interest only of legislators
seeking reelection,138 it also may be entirely beneficial to citizens seeking to
avoid the psychic pain of paying taxes.'39 The limited literature on salience and
the politics of taxation assumes that the benefit of taking salience into account
runs entirely to legislators. The Finkelstein study suggests, for example, that
decreasing the salience of tolls through the collection mechanism reduces the
political costs of raising toll rates.140 The so-called leviathan literature,
136. This argument is limited to legislation. Whether it is appropriate to take salience into
account with respect to regulations involves different considerations and is beyond the scope of this
Article.
137. See infra Section VI.A.
138. See AMOTZ MORAG, ON TAXES AND INFLATION 21 (1965) (suggesting that less visible
taxes are better on both psychological and economic grounds and that "[a]n important factor in the
realities of the limits of taxation are the psychic costs of paying tax, costs which politicians will
carefully heed because they are clearly relevant to the prospects of re-election").
139. Given the inevitability of taxation, taxpayers may prefer taxes that are less visible. A
survey conducted in Canada after the adoption of the GST indicated that Canadians preferred to have the
GST included in the price. See RICHARD M. BIRD, WHERE Do WE GO FROM HERE? ALTERNATIVES TO
THE GST 13 (1994) (noting that "Canadians may not agree on how much they like the government, the
tax structure, or the GST, but they agree they cannot stand to be reminded of the GST every time they
make a purchase"). The experience in Japan, which switched from optional tax-exclusive pricing to
mandatory tax-inclusive pricing, also bears this out. Although an overwhelming majority of registrants
initially opted for tax-exclusive pricing (quoting the tax separately), ultimately most shifted. See
HIROMITSU ISHI, THE JAPANESE TAX SYSTEM 291 (3d ed. 2001) (noting that consumers preferred "to
pay the tax without noticing the tax burden"). In 2004, the Japanese government mandated tax-inclusive
pricing. Kotaro Tsuru, Significance ofShowing Net Prices Thai Include Consumption Tax: With a View
to Improving Business Productivity, RESEARCH INST. OF ECON., TRADE & INDUS. (Feb. 17, 2004),
available at http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/columns/aOl 01 117.htmi.
140. Finkelstein, supra note 52, at 1009.
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discussed below, assumes that politicians are revenue-maximizing and
interested solely in their own reelection. While it is entirely possible that
politicians who favor low-salience taxes will be rewarded with reelection, this
Article argues that there is an additional benefit as well: a political acceptance
of taxes by the populace. In fact, taxpayers may fail to reward or penalize
politicians because they are ignorant of various tax provisions or because they
intentionally ignore them.
This is not to suggest either that Congress should always adopt low-
salience taxes 141 or necessarily that a low-salience tax will be the most
palatable to the populace. Rather, the argument is that it is appropriate for
Congress to take salience into account as a fiscal policy tool. We cannot be
certain that there will be a political response to the salience of a provision; we
also cannot be certain that a response to a low-salience provision will be muted.
We simply do not know the extent to which salience may be the only or the
determining factor in a political response to a tax provision. 142 But there is no
reason to believe that it is wrong for Congress to consider salience in designing
taxes.
B. The Relationship Between Transparency, Complexity, and Salience
Transparency, complexity, and salience are linked concepts. In the case of
low-salience taxes, transparency and complexity concerns impose limits on the
ability of legislators to exploit the salience bias.
Transparency in governance is generally a virtue and at first glance may
appear to complicate Congress's ability to use low-salience taxes. But a lack of
transparency in governance is not essential to the case for exploiting the
salience bias and may even be counterproductive. The argument for using low-
salience taxes is that they make raising revenue palatable to the citizenry-not
that the citizenry should be tricked. If the goal is to obtain the acceptance of a
tax, adopting it in the shadows is not likely to be nearly as effective as adopting
it in the sunlight. Thus, a key to the consent to the use of low-salience
provisions is the knowledge that they are not hidden and information about
them can be obtained. While the parameters of transparency are necessarily
fuzzy, the fact that legislation is adopted in public view is necessary. What is
not necessary, however, is that Congress explain that it is using a low-salience
provision or why it is doing so, as long as it is possible to obtain the legislation
141. Clearly, the sole use of low-salience taxes or changes ultimately will backfire.
Cumulatively, when the taxes or changes become large enough, either tax aversion will kick in or
taxpayers will act rationally and will take them into account. See Galle, supra note 2, at 84 (arguing that
"the rational model likely implies that hidden taxes cannot be a major component of government
budgets").
142. See Alan J. Auerbach, Public Finance in Practice and Theory, 56 CESIFO ECON. STUD.
1, 6 (2010) ("[Wle have little evidence regarding the effects of [low-salience] provisions on such a
grand scale, or about whether the salience of tax provisions changes over time.").
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and figure out its effect if one wanted to do so. Like other instrumentalist
approaches, the use of low-salience taxes incorporates a process value critical
for democratic legitimacy. 14 3 It is important to note that this approach does not
enshrine private advantage or private agendas. Whether the government should
raise revenue and how much will be determined in the public sphere.
For instance, although there has been much academic complaint about the
adoption of the PEP and Pease provisions, they are a very good example of
when using a low-salience provision may be desirable. If it was impossible for
Congress to raise the marginal tax rates directly, using phase-outs may have
accomplished the same thing in a politically viable way. For Congress to have
emphasized that the effect was identical to raising the marginal rate would have
defeated its purpose. However, so long as the provisions were adopted publicly
and their effect could be understood (which it was), the transparency criterion
was satisfied.
The role of complexity is more complicated. Increasing the complexity of
a statutory provision is one way that legislators can decrease its salience. The
statutory language itself can be quite complex, making it difficult to
understand. Or the interaction of one provision with another provision can limit
understanding. Or giving a taxpayer a choice between multiple credits or
deductions can make decisionmaking complicated. Thus, the utility of using
low-salience provisions may fly in the face of a desire for less complexity. That
requires legislators to evaluate the tradeoff between the costs of additional
complexity and political acceptance. We often assume that complexity is
undesirable, but there may be cases where that is not so.1  There may be
situations where political acceptance is more important than simplicity. But in
exploiting the salience bias, legislators should not assume that complexity is
their only tool, and they must be careful to use it only when necessary. As
noted previously, it is possible to create taxes with low political salience that
are not very complex-for example, a tax-inclusive VAT or the employer's
portion of Social Security. Furthermore, the use of too much complexity to
limit salience may backfire because it may raise political hackles simply
because taxpayers cannot understand their obligations or must incur
unacceptable costs to determine them.
143. See infra Part V.
144. Section 469 is a canonical example of a complex statute, and its regulations had the
highly desirable effect of shutting down individual tax shelters in the 1980s-perhaps in part due to their
complexity. The tradeoff was warranted. See George K. Yin, Getting Serious About Corporate Tax
Shelters: Taking a Lesson from History, 54 SMU L. REv. 209, 218-19 (2001).
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V. Responding to Criticisms of Exploiting the Salience Bias
This Part briefly reviews the criticisms directed against exploiting the
salience bias and concludes that none of them is strong enough to preclude
intentionally taking salience into account.145
A. The Deliberate Use ofLow-Salience Tax Provisions Is Undemocratic
Intentional exploitation of cognitive errors-for example, ignoring
nonsalient information-might be said to fly in the face of democratic notions.
It seems to show disrespect on the part of the legislature toward the people and
exploits ignorance.146 The result is that legislators fail to act on voter
preferences. This argument might be restated as follows: (1) the government
has the power to raise revenue and the power to decide the exact form in which
to do so; (2) the government understands that both Method A and Method B
will raise $X in revenue; (3) the government also believes that Method A is
more politically viable because it is preferable to voters since it is less
prominent and therefore less painful; and (4) although the government could
choose to use Method A by publicly passing legislation (thereby satisfying the
transparency criterion), it would be undemocratic to do so.
There are a number of responses to this critique. Broadly, this criticism is
directed at any instrumentalist approach and, taken to the extreme, would
prohibit the state from taking into account many means to accomplish
legitimate government goals. But the essence of government is to weigh
problems and the tradeoffs of various approaches. The use of low-salience
provisions is essentially a tradeoff between the benefits to be gained from
government paternalism and the possible undemocratic nature of exploiting
citizen ignorance or indifference.147 If Congress believes that raising additional
revenue is an important goal, there is no reason that it cannot do so in a way
that the people find acceptable.
145. It is worth noting that criticism is directed at low-salience taxes rather than high-salience
tax provisions, which raise different concerns. See supra note 101.
146. See Bird, supra note 92, at 76 (noting, in support of tax-exclusive prices rather than tax-
inclusive prices, that "hiding the tax bill does not seem a particularly attractive way to build a
sustainable democratic consensus in support of fiscal equilibrium"); Galle, supra note 2, at 109
(discussing "government by deception"); Gillian Lester, Can Joe the Plumber Support Redistribution?,
64 TAx L. REv. (forthcoming 2011) ("[T]he overarching normative question [is] whether I advocate
achieving policy change by using techniques from behavioral psychology to, in essence, mislead people
. . . . The answer is no: to advocate such a position would be troubling from the perspective of
democratic legitimacy."); McCaffery, supra note 40, at 1943.
This critique is very different from that which considers "the wisdom and legitimacy of
government decisions made out of public sight but supposedly for the public good." See Galle, supra
note 2, at 109 & n.235. In this Article's lexicon, low-salience taxes may result from transparent
government decisions.
147. There also may be a tradeoff between distortions caused by citizens acting on incomplete
information (and thus making poor consumption choices) on the one hand, and beneficial increases in
revenue on the other.
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The argument that relying on cognitive bias shows disrespect for the
people must be taken to mean that use of low-salience taxes does not reflect
voter preferences. A second problem with the anti-democracy claim relates to
the difficulty of discerning voter preferences and determining which
preferences should be taken into account. The claim focuses only on voter
preferences with respect to taxes. Even assuming that we know what those
preferences are (more on this below), it ignores voter preferences with respect
to spending. It seems clear that voters want extensive government programs.
Despite some rhetoric about "big government" and runaway spending
programs, there is little support for making significant cuts that would have a
positive effect on the deficit. Voters therefore are sending conflicting signals to
their representatives: they want programs but they do not want to pay for them.
Their preferences on taxes are clear only if we sever taxes from spending; their
preferences on spending are clear only if we sever spending from taxes.
But neither approach makes sense under democratic theory since spending
and revenue are inevitably intertwined. In order to carry out voter preferences,
the government needs to know whether citizens are willing to pay $X for
Program Y-something they usually do not know. It is impossible for
legislators to ascertain whether "we want Program Y" or "we do not want to
pay $X in taxes" represents true preferences. It is not clear therefore that
levying a low-salience tax or adopting a low-salience provision that produces
$X in revenue fails to carry out voter preferences. Suppose the government
does not adopt the tax and instead cuts Program Y? Is that more democratic?
Another alternative is the current approach-retain Program Y but raise
less than $X in revenue. Ultimately, that may result in bankruptcy (as is
practically the case for some states) or fiscal collapse. That too has enormous
costs, and it is certainly not clear that voters prefer this result over raising $X in
a low-salience way. Suppose the government does not raise $X in direct
revenue and does not cut spending for Program Y but pays for it through
inflationary deficit spending. The reduction in purchasing power caused by the
inflationary effect of deficit spending is akin to a tax--one that is even less
politically salient than direct taxation. Why should we assume that voters
would prefer deficit spending rather than low-salience direct taxation?
Even limiting the claim to preferences with respect to taxes, determining
voter preferences is challenging. Calculating voter preferences in general is
difficult enough; understanding voter preferences on policy issues is even more
complex because those preferences are not always observable, and thus, a
proxy must be used. Even in the case where policy issues are salient and part of
a campaign, voting for a particular candidate may obscure voter choice. For
example, suppose a candidate supports lower taxes, gun control, and abortion
choice and wins the election. We cannot be sure that all those who voted for the
candidate support lower taxes; some may have voted solely with respect to the
candidate's position on abortion or guns. And even if we knew that all those
who supported the candidate did so because of her strong position on lower
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taxes, that does not tell us exactly how the electorate wants her to vote on the
design of a tax system.
It is also possible that citizens prefer to be "fooled," that is, that their
actual preference is for a low-salience tax or provision. It seems entirely
possible that voters are aware of the need for revenue but have a high aversion
to taxes, and thus, prefer the taxes to come in a form that is less unpleasant by
being less noticeable. Otherwise, they may bear a cognitive cost-a form of tax
aversion-by being confronted with the tax. Assume that the fiscal illusion,
discussed below, is correct. That is, legislators are revenue-maximizing and
will continually seek to raise nonsalient taxes with as little attention as possible.
And also assume, as discussed below, that over time taxpayers debias-that is,
they come to understand that this is what legislators will do and expect them to
do so.14 8 It follows that if low-salience taxes persist, this approach must be the
preference of voters,149 meaning they prefer to raise revenue by low-salience
taxes. There is some evidence of this with respect to Social Security taxes,
where there seems to be a preference for splitting the notional burden of the tax
between employers and employees although the incidence falls on
employees.150 If that is voters' preference, the anti-democratic claim does not
hold.
Another response to the anti-democratic critique is instrumental. Law is
designed to encourage or incentivize certain behavior. In this case, the behavior
to be encouraged is acceptance of taxes; the behavior to be changed is the
extreme aversion to taxes. Taxes enable governmental policies, and the form in
which they are levied is a pragmatic tool used by the government to effectuate
its ends.
Given the significant uncertainty about voter preferences and the need for
government to use pragmatic tools, the argument that use of a low-salience tax
is undemocratic in that it does not carry out voter choices is not very robust.
148. See Cabral & Hoxby, supra note 58, at 11 ("If a voter knows that politicians are revenue-
maximizing and that they will attempt to raise taxes that are non-salient, a voter should suspect-in the
absence of information-that politicians are continually increasing non-salient taxes to the extent
possible without drawing attention to the increases. A sophisticated voter should assume that a politician
has increased non-salient taxes unless he offers evidence to the contrary.").
149. It is also possible that if tax aversion were high enough, voters would prefer high-salience
taxes. Marika Cabral and Caroline Hoxby argue that "[a] primary implication of our results is that a non-
benevolent government will wish to decrease the salience of taxes and that voters facing a non-
benevolent government will wish to keep taxes' salience high-even if the forms of taxation that are
highly salient cause inconvenience and animus such as that generated by the property tax." Cabral &
Hoxby, supra note 58, at 43.
150. There are plenty of similar examples from the nontax world, such as cherry-flavored
medicine and $9.99 price tags.
289
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 28, 2011
B. Low-Salience Taxes Will Make It Easier for Legislators To Adopt Higher
Taxes
This fiscal illusion, or leviathan claim, is traceable to Amilcare Puviani' 5
and was emphasized in the modem literature by James Buchanan.'5 It is
widely accepted that individuals will have imperfect information on which to
base their decisions about government. The costs of obtaining this information
are such that individuals are not likely to expend the resources to obtain
accurate information. Buchanan and others hypothesize that citizens will
systematically underestimate the cost of public goods and activities and
overestimate the benefits provided and that the government will exploit this
effect. The result will be a larger, less-than-optimal government. People will
overconsume government services because they are unable or unwilling to
obtain the necessary information to estimate the costs correctly. 53
Critics give many reasons for why citizens will systematically
underestimate costs, and the low salience of a tax is one of them.154 Under the
leviathan hypothesis, if taxes are not easily visible, some taxpayers will free-
ride on the efforts of other taxpayers to reduce taxes or oppose increases. 55
Another claimed distortion is that voters who misperceive their tax burden may
not choose the political representatives that they might choose if they had
accurate information about their representative or about political candidates.
151. JAMES M. BUCHANAN, PUBLIC FINANCE IN DEMOCRATIC PROCESS: FISCAL
INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUAL CHOICE 131-36 (1967) (citing AMILCARE PUVIANI, TEORIA DELLA
ILLUSIONE NELLE ENTRATE PUBLICHE (1897)). Puviani assumes that the government can manipulate
taxes so that citizens will underestimate their tax burden by, among other things, tax-inclusive prices,
disaggregation of the tax, and complex tax rules.
152. GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE POWER To TAX: ANALYTICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION 13-33 (1980); BUCHANAN, supra note 151, at 126-43. The
idea can be traced back to John Stuart Mill. See JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY WITH SOME OF THEIR APPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 237 (Stephen Nathanson ed.,
Hackett Publ'g Co. 2004) (1871) (stating that indirect taxes that are less visible than direct taxes affect
government incentives).
153. Sometimes, this argument is framed as economic distortion. For example, Richard Bird
and Pierre-Pascal Gendron note that there is a "hidden political benefit" to a government that imposes a
VAT because revenue comes from "taxes on business inputs and is thus hidden from the consumer."
Richard M. Bird & Pierre-Pascal Gendron, Sales Taxation in Canada: The GST-HST-QST-RST
"System," 63 TAX L. REv. 517, 540 (2010) ("Such hidden taxes are economically distorting, but
nonetheless they often appear to be more palatable politically than visible taxes imposed on final
consumers.").
154. Others include complexity, the form in which the tax is extracted, the costs, and the lack
of effect the citizen would have should she attempt to act on the information.
155. Another somewhat analogous argument applies specifically to consumption taxes, which
is that consumers should have "full, accurate, and clear information of the full sale prices of goods" to
improve consumption choices. Confusion and overconsumption arguably decrease utility and social
welfare. See Nussim, supra note 38, at 4, 7. With respect to income taxes, the choice is the amount of
public goods and activities to "consume."
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Finally, critics prefer high-salience taxes because they will impose a constraint
on legislators, making it difficult to raise taxes.156
There are several problems with this argument.' 57 First, because low-
salience taxes are only one fiscal tool the government may use, it is difficult to
know whether the use of this tool standing alone will lead to a bigger
government. There might in fact be causality, but that is unknown. The
results of empirical work on fiscal illusion generally are mixed, and there is
very little empirical evidence about the relationship between salience and the
size of government.'59 That may be because of the difficulty in determining
taxpayer perceptions about the price of public outputs. A citizen's perception of
price will vary with the means used to extract the funds for government
services. The more complex the system, the more difficult it will be for a
citizen to form a perception. And as already noted, the more salient the
information or the tax provision, the easier it will be to obtain necessary data.
156. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, A Defense of Irrational Taxation?, FREAKONOMICS (Oct. 28, 2009,
12:42 PM), http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/28/a-defense-of-irrational-taxation ("[Als
[a] matter of political economy, we might as a society want to keep our taxes highly salient (even if it
increases the dead-weight loss of taxes) to make sure that our representatives feel more constrained
when deciding whether or not to hike our rates 20 to 40 percent."); Cookson, supra note 96 ("I am not
sure we should give our government officials another incentive to raise taxes."). This is closely related
to the "money machine" argument that is usually raised in connection with adoption of a VAT. There is
some evidence that VAT rates increase over time when they are tax-inclusive and thus less visible. See
Michael Keen & Ben Lockwood, Is the VATa Money Machine?, 59 NAT'L TAX J. 905 (2006).
157. Galle notes that low tax salience would interfere with mechanisms used to constrain the
ability of a government to raise taxes. Specifically, under leviathan-government theories, there is a
competition between governments for mobile taxpayers that limits the rate at which tax increases could
occur. Galle, supra note 2, at 96. This argument is quite weak in the federal setting since taxpayer
mobility is quite low (that is, leaving the country is a rarely exercised option) and for individual
taxpayers, at least, there is little tax competition at the national level. See id. at 98.
158. Becker & Mulligan, supra note 104 (discussing factors that might affect the size of
government).
159. See Brian E. Dollery & Andrew C. Worthington, The Empirical Analysis of Fiscal
Illusion, 10 J. ECON. SuRVS. 261, 264 (1996) (surveying literature and concluding that results are
mixed); Norman Gemmell, Oliver Morrissey & Abuzer Pinar, Fiscal Illusion and the Demand for
Government Expenditures in the UK, 15 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 687 (1999) (reviewing studies); Libor
Dugek, Are Efficient Taxes Responsible for Big Government? Evidence from Tax Withholding (May 9,
2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1585119 (noting that withholding
accounts for some but not all of government growth in the post-war United States). For earlier work, see
Wallace E. Oates, On the Nature and Measurement of Fiscal Illusion: A Survey, in TAXATION AND
FISCAL FEDERALISM: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF RUSSELL MATHEwS 65 (G. Brennan, B.S. Grewel & P.
Groenwegen eds., 1988) (surveying the literature and finding no persuasive connection between salience
and government size).
McCaffery conjectures that one reason that Social Security taxes have grown over time is the fact
that the burden of the employer's share of the tax falls on the employee, but this is hidden and therefore
this method of raising revenue is attractive to Congress. McCaffery, supra note 40, at 1878-80. A recent
international study, however, concludes that countries that collect more of the tax from employees (more
salient collection) do not spend less on public pensions than do countries that collect more from
employers (less salient). Casey B. Mulligan, Ricard Gil & Xavier X. Sala-i-Martin, Social Security and
Democracy, 10 B.E. J. ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y, no. 1, art. 18 (2010),
http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/volI0/issl/artl8.
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There also may be special interests at work that counteract any effect from
salience.o60
Second, this argument is based on the premise that citizens underestimate
their taxes (and thus, receive more government than they perceive to be
optimal). 16 Most studies assume that individuals will undervalue low-salience
taxes, that is, even if they are aware of the tax, they will assume that the
amount of the tax is less than it is (zero if they are unaware of the tax).162 But it
is also possible that citizens will misperceive the tax burden in the other
direction; that is, they will overestimate their tax burden (or even estimate their
burden correctly). We do not have conclusive empirical evidence that voters
systematically underestimate their tax burden, and there is some reason to
believe that they may actually overestimate.163 If individuals are aware of the
tax, they may stake shortcuts in estimating the tax that will result in
overvaluation.
With respect to income taxes, even if we assume that taxpayers will not
correctly calculate their tax burden, it is difficult to know whether they will
underestimate or overestimate the burden. For example, some citizens may
believe that everyone is subject to the top marginal rate or that everyone is
subject to the estate tax. Some may confuse the tax burden with withholding.
160. Casey B. Mulligan, Don't Fear the Invisible Tax, N.Y. ECONOMIX BLOG (Apr. 21, 2010,
6:00 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/21/dont-fear-the-invisible-tax ("I am not
especially surprised that tax visibility is empirically unrelated to the amount of taxation and government
spending, because the impressions of voters who see the more visible taxes are by no means the only
determinant of government spending. Special interests matter too.").
161. These assumptions about citizens' perception of taxes are probably based on the median
voter to whom politicians try to appeal. The theory of the median voter predicts that policy choices will
cluster in the middle and ignore extreme voter preferences. See Roger D. Congleton, The Median Voter
Model, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC CHOICE 382 (Charles K. Rowley & Friedrich Schneider eds.,
2004). Thus, we might say that we get the "correct" level of government if it is the level of government
that we would get with a representative democracy, meaning that it would be like the one that
incorporated the desires of the median voter.
162. For a discussion of cognitive biases that might lead to undervaluation of taxes, see supra
note 80.
163. In the Finkelstein study, electronic-toll users overestimated their tolls rather than
underestimating them. Finkelstein, supra note 52, at 981. This makes it more difficult to argue that it is
easier for the government to raise tolls or rates because taxpayers may believe that they are higher than
they already are. In the Cabral and Hoxby study, homeowners using the tax-escrow method of paying
property taxes did not systematically underestimate their taxes. Cabral & Hoxby, supra note 58, at 29-
30; see also Norman Gemmell, Oliver Morrissey & Abuzer Pinar, Tax Perceptions and Preferences over
Tax Structures in the United Kingdom, 114 ECON. J. 117, 134 (2004) (showing that British taxpayers
systematically overestimated income tax and VAT liabilities); Nussim, supra note 38, at 12 (arguing that
in the case of commodities, consumers, facing uncertainty, will not necessarily undervalue prices).
164. This might occur because they will round up a tax-exclusive price. For example, the
current sales tax rate on purchases in New York City is 8.875%. Sales and Use Tax, NYC FIN.,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dof/html/business/business tax nyssales.shtml (last visited Feb. 6, 2011).
Those who take the sales tax into account often do not go to the trouble of actually calculating the
correct amount of tax but routinely round up to add an extra 10% to purchases. There may actually be
two errors. Suppose for example that the item costs $89. The consumer may estimate the tax as $8.90
(10%) and then may add $9 to the price (rounding) to get $98 or may take 10% of $90 (easy to
calculate) to get $99. In either case, the actual tax-inclusive price is $96.89.
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Many are not able to accurately determine their marginal tax rate. 165 Citizens
may also ignore some taxes (that are not salient) and concentrate only on those
that are prominent. They may also fail to take into account government benefits
received that should be offset against the tax. It is also possible that the
populace will systematically assume that there is a low-salience tax that they
either cannot uncover or do not want to attempt to uncover. Since they do not
have details about the tax, they may add some additional amount to the burden
they can calculate.
Assume, for example, that voters are willing to elect those who would
impose a 30% tax. Suppose that voters believe that elected officials are always
going to impose a 10% low-salience tax-they just are not able to spot it. As a
result, they elect officials who are committed to 20% high-salience or visible
taxes. Although both voters and officials might prefer visible 30% taxes, they
cannot achieve that so long as voters believe that officials will add a low-
salience 10% tax. Thus, any attempt to impose higher visible taxes will be met
with defeat because voters will believe that this will result in a tax burden
higher than 30%. In this case, we end up with a second-best solution that
produces the right result, namely, a 20% visible tax and a 10% less visible tax
that funds the level of government desired by the voters.166
Now assume that voters believe that the total taxes imposed are 40%,
when they prefer 30%. If in fact the taxes are 30%, there is a problem only if
they turn the elected officials out of office based on false information.
Otherwise, citizens still have their preferences about the level of government
carried out. Finally, assume that voters believe that there is a 15% low-salience
tax (that they cannot identify), and therefore, they pressure officials to keep
high-salience taxes quite low, say at 15%. (This might occur because taxpayers
are so distrustful of government that they assume that it will impose a high low-
salience tax.) If the low-salience taxes are actually 10%, citizens receive less
government than they prefer. Under this scenario, the leviathan argument does
not hold. If taxpayers overestimate their tax burden, they are extremely unlikely
to receive more government than they prefer.
To the extent, however, that citizens underestimate their tax burden, it
may be possible for the government to impose a higher rate of tax-and thus a
higher level of government-that does not correspond to citizen preferences.
Accordingly, suppose that citizens believe that total taxes imposed are only
165. See, e.g., Steven Sheffrin, Perceptions ofFairness in the Crucible of Tax Policy, in TAX
PROGRESSIVITY AND INCOME INEQUALrrY 309, 311-12 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1994) (reviewing the
literature on this point).
166. Broadly stated, this is similar to the principal-agent story in corporate governance.
Assume it is desirable to pay a fixed amount of compensation to managers. Since we know they would
shirk, we might engage in monitoring or incentive compensation although each imposes additional costs.
Given shirking, however, the best mix of compensation is one that would otherwise be second-best.
Similarly, while it would be better to impose only high-salience taxes, if the populace believes that there
might be low-salience provisions, a mix is a second-best solution.
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20% when actual taxes are 30%. This may be because they are unable to
accurately assess tax rates or because they are unaware of a 10% low-salience
tax. This creates an opportunity for the government to propose a 10% tax
increase without opposition because taxpayers will believe that it will fund a
government at their preferred 30% level. And that would produce a larger
government than voters prefer. But this would be true only if voters
systematically underestimated their taxes-a fact that has not been proven.
It is possible that there is a subset of voters that prefers higher taxes,
perhaps because they favor goods and services provided by a large government
or perhaps because they favor significant redistribution. Hiding taxes does
nothing to win the support of those voters. While this might seem to defeat the
use of low-salience taxes, such taxpayers would appear to be the exception
rather than the rule.
C. Debiasing
A third objection to the use of low-salience tax provisions is based on the
possibility of debiasing. An individual who incurs an economic cost as a result
of a bias (for example, ignorance or intentionally ignoring a tax) has an
incentive to debias herself-that is, to obtain or stop ignoring information about
the tax provision. Given that low-salience taxes are not actually hidden,
taxpayers have a good source of information. If individuals routinely debiased,
the use of low-salience taxes as a fiscal policy tool would produce a short-term
advantage at best.
This critique is valid only to the extent we believe that debiasing would
actually occur. But there are several reasons to believe that debiasing is not
likely. First, taxpayers have to be aware that they are making a cognitive
error-this depends on feedback, which might come from other taxpayers or
perhaps from politicians. In order for feedback to come from other taxpayers,
there must be some group that does not ignore low-salience provisions and
understands their effect. That is mostly like to be experts or perhaps high-
income taxpayers who bear a larger tax burden. History tells us that experts
largely have been ineffective in capturing public attention. They will have little
effect unless they grab the imagination of the general populace. High-income
taxpayers do not have much incentive to provide feedback to others who fail to
take low-salience taxes into account. While it is theoretically possible for one
political group or policy entrepreneurs to provide information to voters in order
to gain political advantage, at the federal level that is less likely because both
parties benefit from the increased revenue from low-salience taxes. Even if one
political group chose to "disclose" low-salience taxes, it is entirely possible that
it would not be believed or that voters would not care.
Generally, individuals shed themselves of cognitive bias through
education. But acquiring and understanding information about public finance
and various taxes is problematic and costly. The details of taxation are
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inordinately complex and, most would say, quite boring and incomprehensible.
It would take a significant, time-consuming campaign to educate individuals
sufficiently about taxation so that they would focus on less prominent taxes or
tax provisions. And the payoff is quite low. For most citizens, the change in
taxes levied would be small. And if low-salience provisions are repealed,
legislators may adopt high-salience taxes in their place. Another possibility is
that debiasing may come from experience. Laboratory studies show that where
individuals play a game repeatedly, their cognitive biases decrease over time.
But there is doubt that these results could be replicated in the real world of
taxes where experience with taxes is sporadic and for many only an annual
event. Furthermore, if a tax provision is so low-salience that taxpayers are
unaware of it, their "experience" with it will be quite limited.
There is a further problem in how debiased citizens express their
newfound dislike of low-salience taxes. The most direct means is a vote in a
congressional election, but this issue is likely to be swamped by other more
salient and pressing issues. 168 Finally, low-salience taxes are not invisible, and
information about them is available. If taxpayers are choosing to ignore such
taxes, that may reflect their preference. If so, they may not have an incentive to
debias.
For all these reasons, the likelihood of debiasing is quite low, and thus, the
argument that the use of low-salience taxes would be ineffective is not
convincing.
D. Distributional Concerns
Another potential problem is that low-salience taxes may be regressive.169
Taxpayers who are simply ignorant of a tax (or a tax feature) may be lower
income because wealthier individuals either are better educated or can pay
someone to look out for their interests. Thus, it is less likely that a tax provision
would completely escape the notice of a well-to-do individual. If so, legislators
may find low-salience taxes more effective with low-income individuals than
with high-income individuals.
Is the distributional concern that Congress will fool only low-income
taxpayers and therefore that low-income taxpayers will bear a larger-than-
desirable tax burden? The answer to that question is unknown. Very little is
known about heterogeneity (with respect to income) and cognitive bias because
167. See Sausgruber & Tyran, supra note 59.
168. For arguments as to why debiasing may not occur, see Galle, supra note 2, at 89-93; and
McCaffery & Baron, supra note 11, at 1785-86. The latter authors' experiments showed little effect
from individual education. Id
169. See Galle, supra note 2, at 100.
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the literature is quite nascent.' 70 The conclusion that low-income taxpayers pay
less attention to all low-salience taxes is far from robust, and the evidence that
exists cuts both ways. Although one might expect low-income taxpayers to be
more attentive to low-salience taxes because of their budget constraint, there is
some evidence that, with respect to the purchase of certain consumer goods,
they are not.' High-income individuals may be more likely to ignore a tax
(even if it is known) because the disutility of computing a tax is larger than the
subjective present value of the tax. In that case, low-salience taxes may actually
affect high-income taxpayers more than low-income taxpayers. One reason this
might be so is that high-income taxpayers have higher opportunity costs. While
this is likely to be true with commodity taxes, it is less plausible with respect to
a broad-based tax where the present value of the tax would have to be quite low
to be less than the disutility of calculating the tax. As compared to commodity
taxes, the income tax would (or could be) significant; furthermore, the disutility
of making calculations would decrease with wealth, assuming wealth correlates
with tax burden.
It also does not follow that all low-salience taxes must be regressive. For
example, Social Security, viewed as a low-salience tax because its incidence is
not understood, is indeed regressive. But other low-salience income tax
provisions like the AMT and the PEP and Pease provisions are targeted solely
at high-income taxpayers.
Another potential distributional concern is that the tax system will be less
progressive (or regressive) than citizens actually prefer. If a tax is ignored,
citizens will be unaware of its characteristics, including the degree of
progressivity. For example, most voters would be unaware of the degree of
redistribution attributable to the corporate tax because of its low salience and
thus would have a misperception about the extent of progressivity in the
systeml172
On the other hand, low-salience taxes may increase progressivity in a way
that is politically acceptable. One could imagine that a direct monetary transfer
from the wealthy to the poor might not be palatable even to those who favored
a good deal of redistribution, but it might be accomplished via phase-outs or the
AMT. Of course, it is possible that low-salience taxes could result in too much
redistribution, meaning that there is more distribution than citizens in the
abstract would choose. Because the redistribution is not visible, they would not
object.
170. See Jacob Goldin & Tatiana Homonoff, Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Cigarette Tax Salience
and Regressivity 2 (Princeton Univ. Indus. Relations Section, Working Paper No. 561, 2010), available
at http://www.irs.princeton.edulpubs/pdfs/561.pdf.
171. See id. at 30-31 (showing that attentiveness to sales taxes on cigarettes imposed at the
register declines with income but noting that this pattern may not hold for all goods).
172. This potential equity problem could be due to other cognitive biases, as well as salience.
See McCaffery & Baron, supra note I1, at 1781-82 (noting that "psychologically pleasing taxes" such as
the corporate income tax generally are not as progressive as people perceive them to be).
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In sum, there are three possibilities: low-salience taxes may result in less
redistribution than citizens prefer, may result in more redistribution than they
prefer, or may help to achieve politically the preferred distribution. Without
more empirical work, it is difficult to be sure which predominates.
E. Ineptness
Several final concerns suggest a practical rather than a normative critique,
that is, that the use of low-salience provisions simply will not work. One
concern is that legislators will not be able to use a cognitive bias carefully in
designing a tax or provision. If they are not able to do this well, then perhaps it
would be better if they did not do it at all. Another charge is that exploiting
salience will not work as a fiscal tool because anti-tax forces will expose the
low-salience provision. And, finally, taxpayers may object to being
manipulated. 173
While each concern has some validity, none is powerful enough to rule
out the use of low-salience provisions in tax design. The fact that legislators on
occasion may do a poor job of using a particular tool does not justify
eliminating that approach from its fiscal toolkit. The best response to the final
two charges is that taxpayers may prefer low-salience provisions and would not
consider themselves manipulated even if the design were pointed out to them.
While individuals may have a general aversion to being manipulated, the
current use of low-salience provisions suggests that they are not viewed as
exploitative. There are numerous examples of low-salience provisions that
currently exist that have been exposed to sunlight, and yet, Congress retains
them. That may be because it is only the cognoscenti who recognize their
effect, while average taxpayers are either unaware of them or their
consequences. Or they may continue to exist because everyone wants them to
exist. That is, both Congress and taxpayers recognize the need for taxes and
prefer them in this form-Congress because it is less likely to be punished, and
taxpayers because low-salience taxes are less painful.
VI. An Example of Appropriate Use
This Part lays out a specific example of when it would be appropriate for
Congress to exploit the salience bias. When the politics of taxation are such that
it is impossible for Congress to raise tax rates directly and additional revenue is
warranted, it is appropriate for Congress to intentionally adopt low-salience
features of an income tax. This Part briefly explores the current political
economy of tax legislation that makes the straightforward adoption of tax
legislation-particularly changes in tax rates and increases in tax revenues-
173. This last concern depends on taxpayers understanding the impact of low-salience taxes.
As suggested above, that requires both debiasing and a rejection of the process once it is understood.
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extremely difficult even in a period of high (and rising) deficits. Taxes with low
salience are one useful fiscal tool for overcoming these political-economy
problems. This Part suggests that low-salience tax provisions may be a way to
get past the "no new taxes" rhetoric that has plagued public discourse about
taxes for the last several decades and that ultimately has hamstrung Congress.
There are three components of this argument: tax aversion, budget deficits, and
the politics of taxation.
A. Tax Aversion
The political-economy story depends in part on the public's dislike of
taxes. A growing literature has considered the concept of "tax aversion" as
something distinct from loss aversion.1 74 The notion is that the disutility from
paying taxes is greater than that from other types of losses. 17 5 The core idea is
that calling something a tax rather than something else (for example, a fee or
mandated payment) creates a negative reaction.'76 While most of the work has
focused on how this might increase tax avoidance and evasion,' 77 and therefore,
affect compliance, this disutility likely also manifests itself by affecting
Congress's ability to raise revenue. Thus, we start from the proposition that
although citizens desire the public goods (and perhaps redistribution) provided
by the government, it will be difficult to extract the revenue needed to pay for
public goods.
174. McCaffery, supra note 40, at 1878 (defining tax aversion as "a phenomenon ... akin to
but distinct from loss aversion, whereby individuals attach disproportionate disutility to government
extractions perceived or labeled as 'taxes"').
175. See Fennell & Fennell, supra note I1, at 79 (defining one kind of tax aversion as "the
amount by which one's aversion to a tax exceeds the economic cost of the tax"). It is not hard to locate
undocumented statements that Americans hate taxes-it is a given requiring no support. See, e.g.,
McCaffery & Baron, supra note 37, at 289 ("People do not like to pay taxes."); Joshua D. Rosenberg,
The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive Us Crazy and How We Can Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAX
REv. 155, 157-58 (1996) ("Most working Americans would readily acknowledge that taxes drive them
crazy.. .. [O]nly tax laws seem capable of engendering nearly universal anger, anxiety, paranoia and
outright hatred, as well as substantial noncompliance. . . . For most Americans, any tax is a bad
tax. . . .").
176. McCaffery & Baron, supra note 81, at 117-18 (finding that labeling something as a tax is
likely to make it less preferable than, for example, labeling it as a fee). McCaffery and Baron conducted
a number of experiments in which subjects evaluated payment mechanisms for various government
programs. They found that labels matter and the subjects generally reacted negatively to new taxes.
McCaffery & Baron, supra note 11, at 1759-61. In another experiment, Catherine Eckel, Philip
Grossman, and Rachel Johnston also found that reactions were different to a payment labeled as a tax as
compared to an unlabeled payment. Participants who were told that the sum of money they had been
given had been subject to a tax tended to reduce their voluntary contributions to charity to offset the tax.
Catherine C. Eckel, Philip J. Grossman & Rachel M. Johnston, An Experimental Test of the Crowding
Out Hypothesis, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 1543 (2005).
177. See, e.g., McCaffery & Baron, supra note 81, at 117-18.
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B. The Budget Crisis
A second component of the instrumentalist argument is that Congress
needs to raise revenue. The unsustainable trajectory of the U.S. budget is well
known.178 Federal debt held by the public could surpass its previous highest
level-109% of GDP-by 2020.179 The Congressional Budget Office estimates
that expenditures on Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, the Children's
Health Insurance program, and health-insurance subsidies provided through
soon-to-be-established insurance exchanges will constitute 16% of GDP in
2036.180 If current law remains in force, in thirty years, government revenues
are expected to meet only two-thirds of all expected expenditures in 2080.181 It
is widely agreed that this is a crisis that cannot be ignored forever.182 Growing
budget deficits will result in rising interest rates that discourage investment in
the United States and ultimately will cause economic disruptions. It is also
understood that there are only two solutions: cutting spending and raising
revenue. To date, despite rhetoric about the need to cut spending programs,
neither Congress nor the public has shown much taste for doing so. Cutting
"government waste" would make only a small dent in the problem; large-scale
cuts in Social Security and Medicare would be required, and that may be
politically implausible. Thus, the United States faces the need for significant
additional revenue that must be raised from a populace with an aversion to
taxes.
C. Political Rhetoric and the Impossibility ofRaising Taxes Directly
Congress has'altered the rate structure of the income tax in the past,
usually when substantial amounts of additional revenue were needed, and often
178. See, e.g., The Long-Term Budget Outlook and Options for Slowing the Growth of Health
Care Costs: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 110th Cong. 1 (2008) (statement of Peter R. Orszag,
Director, Congressional Budget Office), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/93xx/doc9385/06-17-
LTBOTestimony.pdf ("[U]nder any plausible scenario, the federal budget is on an unsustainable
path.").
179. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-468SP, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S
LONG-TERM FISCAL OUTLOOK, JAN. 2010 UPDATE 1 (2010), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dl0468sp.pdf
180. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REDUCING THE DEFICIT: SPENDING AND REVENUE OPTIONS 3
(2011), available athttp://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/120xx/docl2085/03-10-ReducingTheDeficit.pdf.
181. FIN. MGMT. SERV., U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT, 2009-MANAGEMENT'S DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 23 chart J, available at
http://www.gao.gov/financial/fy2009/09mda.pdf.
182. See, e.g., David A. Stockman, The Bipartisan March to Fiscal Madness, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 24, 2011, at A22.
183. See, e.g., Economic Outlook: Hearing Before the Joint Econ. Comm., 109th Cong. (2005)
(statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/TESTIMONY/2005/20051103/default.htm; Alan J.
Auerbach, Jason Furman & William G. Gale, Facing the Music: The Fiscal Outlook at the End of the
Bush Administration, 119 TAX NOTES 981 (2008).
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in ways that were direct and salient.'4 But in the last several decades, Congress
has found it difficult to increases rates or to expand the base in a salient way.
Indeed, the public's aversion to taxes has been exploited so much that it has
become almost impossible to raise taxes directly. There are several reasons for
this, which this Section briefly catalogues.
1. Interest Group Politics Predicts That Congress Will Not Support
Raising Taxes Directly
The dominant and standard view of politics for the last several decades
has been public-choice theory, which usually is taken to mean interest group
politics. That approach treats the government as an actor in what is
essentially a market transaction, providing goods and services (via legislation)
to interest groups that want to maximize the income of their members. 186
Interest groups bid for legislation and pay for it with campaign contributions,
votes in elections, and the like.' 87
The originator of this approach, Mancur Olson, argued that two conditions
could predict when effective interest groups would emerge and the policies that
they prefer. The first is that the groups must be small. Although every member
of a group stands to benefit from the results obtained, formation and
coordination costs are high, and they increase as the group grows in size. The
second is the existence of free-riders. The desired legislation may affect a
significantly larger group, and this creates an incentive to free-ride. Smaller
groups lessen the coordination problem,-and narrower policy objectives lessen
the free-rider problem. Thus, one would expect to see small groups who will
gain a lot from very narrow objectives controlling legislation.
184. During World War I, rates were increased to fund war expenditures. Rates were
subsequently decreased in the 1920s. Anne L. Alstott & Ben Novick, War, Taxes, and Income
Redistribution in the Twenties: The 1924 Veterans' Bonus and the Defeat ofthe Mellon Plan, 59 TAX L.
REV. 373, 375 (2006) (noting that tax rates increased from 7% in 1915 to 77% in 1918, and then
decreased to 25% in 1926). Tax rates rose during the Depression under Hoover and Roosevelt. In the
decades after World War II, top marginal rates declined dramatically, from 94% in 1945 to 28% in 1988.
U.S. Federal Individual Income Tax Rates History, 1913-2011, TAX FOUND.,
http://www.taxfoundation.org/publications/show/l51.html (last updated Mar. 23, 2011).
185. Little attention was paid to tax legislation during the heyday of public-interest theory.
Under this approach, the government is assumed to be motivated to improve general welfare by
financing public goods and correcting for market failure. Those who hew to this explanation emphasize
ideology-legislators have a desire to enact good policy that will improve society. No one seems to have
ever suggested that tax legislation could be completely explained by public-interest theory. This
approach was subject to a good deal of criticism and ultimately was questioned in the academic
literature.
186. This approach is traced to Mancur Olson and has remained prominent. See MANCUR
OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
187. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through
Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986). Public-choice theory
is not without its critics. See, e.g., Steven Kelman, Why Public Ideas Matter, in THE POWER OF PUBLIC
IDEAS 31 (Robert B. Reich ed., 1988); Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38
STAN. L. REv. 29, 48-49 (1985).
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In the tax area, there is a fairly long history of examining interest group
politics.188 There have been several prominent attempts to explain tax
legislation from a public-choice perspective. Richard Doemberg and Fred
McChesney have argued that the increasing rate of federal tax legislation that
proved to be unstable could be explained by Congress's responding to well-
organized groups who paid for benefits that maximized their wealth. 189 They
contend that business groups that lobby to obtain tax favors for themselves or
their constituents are the primary "public" participants in the tax legislative
process, in which tax legislation is delivered to the highest bidder.190 These
groups are interested in only short-term contracts rather than long-term deals
because there is a turnover in the players on Capitol Hill. Politicians are also
more interested in short-term deals because they can extract more benefit each
time the process begins. 191 Standard public-choice theory posits that public
interest or public opposition to interest groups will be diffuse and ineffective.
In the tax arena, that opposition historically has come from the Treasury
Department, the Joint Committee on Taxation, and certain public-interest tax
lobbying organizations. These groups, however, have been largely ineffective.
Another version of public-choice theory is that developed by Edward
McCaffery and Linda Cohen, which they dub "ex ante rent extraction."' 92
McCaffery and Cohen concede that interest group politics plays a major role in
the development of legislation, but they argue that it cannot explain all tax
legislation. Under this approach, because Congress is addicted to the money
received in the form of campaign contributions, it creates special-interest
groups from which it hopes to subsequently extract contributions. The
difference between this mode of analysis and standard interest group analysis is
that the politicians themselves solve the coordination problems. The politicians
who are "rent-extracting" precede the interest groups that are "rent-seeking."
188. See, e.g., JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH:
LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM (1987); TIMoTHY J. CONLAN,
MARGARET T. WRIGHTSON & DAVID R. BEAM, TAXING CHOICES: THE POLITICS OF TAX REFORM
(1990) (analyzing the processes behind the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986); THOMAS J. REESE,
THE POLITICS OF TAXATION (1980) (explaining the difficulty in passing meaningful tax-reform
legislation); William L. Cary, Pressure Groups and the Revenue Code: A Requiem in Honor of the
Departing Uniformity of the Tax Laws, 68 HARV. L. REV. 745, 747-73 (1955) (identifying sources of
pressure on Congress to create special tax rules); Rebecca M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises: The Political
Economy of Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code, 40 GA. L. REV. 335 (2006) (discussing how interest
groups use sunset provisions to extract rent); Stanley S. Surrey, The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist-
How Special Tax Provisions Get Enacted, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1149-81 (1957) (attempting to
enumerate reasons that tax lobbyists seek "loopholes").
189. Richard Doemberg & Fred McChesney, Doing Good or Doing Well?: Congress and the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 891 (1987) [hereinafter Doernberg & McChesney, Doing
Good]; Richard Doernberg & Fred McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing Durability of
Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913, 926 (1987) [hereinafter Doernberg & McChesney, Accelerating
Rate].
190. Doemberg & McChesney, Doing Good, supra note 189, at 897-98.
191. Doernberg & McChesney, Accelerating Rate, supra note 189, at 946-54.
192. Edward J. McCaffery & Linda R. Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci Gulch: The New Logic of
Collective Action, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1159 (2006).
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The politicians focus on tax provisions that apply to very few people who face
high stakes. In a sense, they threaten to eliminate the rent by imposing higher
taxes or eliminating a tax incentive. This is most effective when the group
affected has the ability to organize and be politically effective.19 3
Interest group politics is a very robust explanation for the incremental
nature of the overwhelming majority of tax legislation. Almost all provisions in
tax legislation are incremental changes to the law as it exists, and most benefit
specific interest groups, usually business.194 There is no reason to believe that
interest groups have lost any power over the last two decades, nor is there any
reason to believe that legislators are less interested in rent-extraction. In fact,
the reverse is true. A number of factors make it likely that interest group
politics will continue to control the political agenda and will be a barrier to rate
increases and raising revenue.
Both the rent-seeking and the rent-extraction models predict that small
groups with high stakes will emerge to control legislation, specifically
legislation with concentrated specific benefits and costs to the groups.
Conversely, groups will have less interest in legislation with diffuse benefits
and significant costs. One implication is that special-interest groups largely will
have no interest in general tax rate increases due to both coordination problems
and free-riding. While there may be particular aspects of rate changes (for
example, changes to the corporate tax rate) that might cause interest groups to
form, general rate changes are not likely to spark the formation of such groups.
Rate changes present the classic example of free-riding since almost everyone
will be affected.
Setting rates is therefore a ballot-box issue, and neither rent-seeking
interest groups nor rent-extracting politicians are interested in ballot-box issues.
The rent-extraction model would predict that Congress would avoid a ballot-
box issue, that is, one that is likely to appeal to voters generally, particularly
193. McCaffery and Cohen list five properties of rent-extraction: (1) the issue will be one of
high stakes to a small group with a narrow policy focus that matters to the group; (2) the issue will not
be of much importance to most voters and therefore is not likely to be that important in election politics;
(3) the issue will be two-sided, that is, groups on both sides will be willing to pay so that legislators can
gain no matter what their position is; (4) there must be plausible action that Congress can undertake; and
(5) the issue will be such that the legislation will be reasonably long-lived so that Congress cannot
immediately undo it, thus negating an incentive for interest groups to pay. Id. at 1177-78. One result,
according to McCaffery and Cohen, is that there is little incentive to actually solve the problem since
stringing along all the interest groups creates more opportunities for them to pay. Id. at 1179. For an
example applying the rent-extraction model, see Kysar, supra note 188.
194. See David R. Beam, Timothy J. Conlan & Margaret T. Wrightson, Solving the Riddle of
Tax Reform: Party Competition and the Politics of Ideas, 105 POL. Sci. Q. 202 (1990). Interest group
politics does not, however, explain all incremental tax legislation. There are some (although not many)
examples that do not seem to be in response to rent-extraction. For example, the legislation that created
a uniform definition of "child" across various sections of the Tax Code, see Working Families Tax
Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, §§ 201-207, 118 Stat. 1166, 1169-78 (codified in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.), as well as two major simplification efforts, the Installment Sales Revision Act,
Pub. L. No. 96-471, 94 Stat. 2247 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), and
the Subchapter S Simplification Act, Pub. L. No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669 (1982) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), were targeted quite broadly.
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during elections. On the surface, this seems incorrect. The evidence is that
politicians devote a good deal of attention to taxes in election years.
Presidential candidates often include comments about the tax system in their
standard stump speeches, and reform of the tax system is a perennial question
in presidential debates (but increasing taxes and facing the budget crisis are
generally off the table). Although legislators also talk about taxes in election
campaigns, interest group politics helps to explain why in fact they do not act
on their expressed concern. Furthermore, many congressional politicians are no
longer concerned about reelection-they are assured of retaining their seats. 196
Thus, there is little need to move on a ballot-box issue.
The ex ante rent-extraction model predicts that payments to politicians
might occur simply to maintain the status quo.197 Increasing taxes upsets the
status quo. While there might be winners, it is highly unlikely that they would
be interest groups. There are few ways for Congress to extract money out of
rate changes; thus it has very little interest in doing so. On the other hand, it is
relatively simple for Congress to extract money in order to keep the status quo.
Accordingly, legislators have an interest in floating specific proposals that, in
keeping with the rent-extraction model, might attract small groups facing large
stakes. Public-choice theory suggests that interest groups prefer repeat
opportunities to bargain and legislators also prefer recurring opportunities to
extract rent. Therefore, those interest groups who are in fact lobbying for
tangible benefits for their members are likely not to be interested in rate
changes that might block future opportunities for bargaining.
In sum, the standard view of politics predicts that raising taxes-a ballot-
box issue-will be of little interest to political actors.
2. Institutional Barriers Predict That Congress Will Not Support
Increasing Taxes Directly
There are a number of institutional barriers that make it exceedingly
difficult to reach a consensus on raising marginal tax rates or raising revenue.
Our Madisonian system of checks and balances builds in a need for support
from both the executive and legislative branches. Traditionally, the political
obstacles are overcome on rare occasions when a very strong president is
elected with party majorities in both houses of Congress. The president then
shapes public opinion to support legislative reform. This is usually what has
195. See Seema Mehta & Stuart Silverstein, Obama Courts Middle-Class Virginians with Tax
Strategy, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2008, at Al 1 (reporting that then-presidential candidate Barack Obama
had proposed "a $1,000 tax break for most wage earners"); Tom Redburn, Huckabee Sales Tax Plan
Appeals, But Is It Fair?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2008, at A16 (assessing Republican presidential candidate
Mike Huckabee's tax-reform proposal to replace the federal income and payroll taxes with a national
sales tax).
196. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Reelection Rates over the Years, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/reelect.php (last visited Feb. 7, 2011).
197. McCaffery & Cohen, supra note 192, at 1174.
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happened when anything that could be construed as tax reform occurs.1 98 But
shifts in party politics and the role of congressional leaders have changed this
dynamic.
George Yin argues that over the last several decades there has been a
strengthening of the party system and a corresponding decrease in committee
leadership, especially in the House.'99 A number of events have created this
situation. They include the repeal of the automatic seniority system for
choosing the committee chairs, as well as curtailment of the chair's power and
reduction in committee staffs. 200 At the same time, the party assumed more
control over legislation, including setting the agenda and providing language. 20 1
While this was happening on the Hill, historically neutral tax policy advisors in
the Treasury Department became less important as tax policy analysis shifted to
the political office in the White House.202 Yin argues that the effect on tax
legislation is ambiguous. A top-down organizational structure can offset the
possibility that various committees acting independently can produce
legislation that is not favored by anyone. Party leaders can require committees
to commit to support legislation favored by the party. If the party has no
interest in raising rates, the committees will not either. 203 Also contributing to
the lack of interest in real tax policy, Yin argues, is the loss of specialization
benefits provided by strong committees and the decline in the committee's
ability to provide good information. This factor is important, however, only if
the parties are not interested in tax increases.204 The political party has been
more important for a long time, and neither party has shown much interest in
the budget crisis or in additional sources of revenue.
Another aspect of this is the "Permanent Campaign." 205 The necessity for
Congress to be constantly involved in a reelection campaign that requires huge
amounts of fundraising has resulted in an external focus that does not permit
time for "working as a deliberate and collaborative body" for the public
206
good. The economics of campaign financing are such that House members
must spend a great deal of time raising money, usually far away from
198. See SUSAN B. HANSEN, THE POLITICS OF TAXATION: REVENUE WITHOUT
REPRESENTATION 62 (1983) ("[M]ajor tax innovations show strong links to periods of political
realignment and social crisis, in marked contrast to the incremental policies characteristic of 'normal'
politics.").
199. George K. Yin, Is the Tax System Beyond Reform?, 58 FLA. L. REv. 977, 1019 (2006).
200. Id. at 1019-20.
201. Id. at 1021.
202. Id. at 1024.
203. Id. at 1033.
204. Id. at 1036-37.
205. See THE PERMANENT CAMPAIGN AND ITS FUTURE (Norman J. Ornstein & Thomas E.
Mann eds., 2000). The book's thesis is essentially that there is no longer any distinction between
governance and campaigning.
206. See Yin, supra note 199, at 1025.
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Washington.207 Because members are often in very safe seats, they are not
worried about ballot-box issues, particularly issues that might actually cost
votes. Instead, they are most interested in raising money. The huge amount of
time that must be focused on fundraising and campaigning during the
Permanent Campaign makes it difficult to mount a huge and potentially
unpopular undertaking such as solving the budget crisis. There is time only for
symbolic efforts.208
Another institutional factor is budget rules, specifically pay-as-you-go
("PAYGO") budget rules. Budget policy is no longer exogenous to tax policy,
and there are features of budget policy that make significant changes to the tax
system quite difficult. When Congress operates under PAYGO rules, any
legislation to lower revenues or expand entitlement spending-relative to
current law projections (that is, the "baseline")-must be offset with
corresponding revenue increases or spending cuts. However, unlike the
statutory PAYGO rules that expired several years ago, which required
sequestration by the executive branch if they were violated, 209 the current rules
are internal rules that Congress must choose to enforce and can waive by a
supermajority vote.210 The fact that Congress recently approved an AMT patch
without providing for revenue offsetS211 is evidence that PAYGO rules may not
be a strong barrier. Even in the absence of the PAYGO rules, Congress has
often acted with a revenue-neutrality constraint. Both Treasury 1212 and the
recent tax reform panel213 also operated under a revenue-neutrality constraint,
that is, reform must raise no more and no less than current revenue raised by
the income tax. While it would appear that the need for revenue neutrality
would make it easier for Congress to raise tax rates directly to offset spending
proposals, in practice Congress has had to resort to indirect means.
207. See Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative
Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 87 (1990) (discussing the
effects of campaign financing).
208. See Yin, supra note 199, at 1029. Yin cites the perennial introduction of the Tax Code
Termination bill as an example of the lack of seriousness with which Congress addresses significant
policy issues. The bill would repeal the entire code, to be followed by an unspecified simple and fair tax.
Id. at 1029 & n.203.
209. Budget Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 101-508, tit. XIII, § 13101, 104 Stat. 1388-573,
1388-575 to 1388-577 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of2 & 15 U.S.C.).
210. Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-139, tit. I, 124 Stat. 8.
211. American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 11-5, tit. 1, §§ 1011-
1012, 123 Stat. 115, 319.
212. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH 14 (1984), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Pages/tax-reform-
index.aspx.
213. See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAx REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PRO-
GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM 42 (2005), available at
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxtopics/upload/tax-panel-2.pdf.
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3. Mitigating Factors That Might Result in Raising Taxes Directly Are
Not Likely To Occur
There are different forms of politics that might create a setting in which
tax increases would be considered, but those forms are either not present or
lead to the opposite conclusion. David Beam, Timothy Conlan, and Margaret
Wrightson argue that one important form is the "politics of ideas."21 Four
factors might push interest group politics to the side. The first is the concept
that ideas are an independent and influential force in politics. The key
difference between the politics of ideas and interest group politics is that
individuals will not necessarily act in their own self-interest-at least, not in
their own economic self-interest.215 The second factor is that the power of ideas
is expressed in symbolism or in public-relations values. Third, experts will play
a major role. As David Bradford has noted, "experts inevitably shape the
crucial details of economic regulatory systems." 216 The fourth factor is the role
played by policy entrepreneurs (individuals "who assemble[] the key
ingredients essential for government action").217 Daniel Shaviro also cites the
rise of policy entrepreneurship as one factor that offsets a narrow reading of
interest group politics as the only explanatory fact. By policy entrepreneurship,
he means "the investment of personal resources in promoting a particular
policy, with the anticipated 'return' often depending on the enactment of
legislation." 218
While to some extent there has been a politics of ideas with respect to
taxes for the last decade, that idea has largely been the demonization of taxes
and the need to keep rates low. Symbolism and public relations with regard to
taxes have occurred, but they have pushed in the other direction. Although
think tanks and other policy entrepreneurs have attempted to educate the public
about budget unsustainability and have offered proposals to tame the budget, 219
214. Beam et al., supra note 194, at 202-08; see also Shaviro, supra note 207, at 98 (noting
that ideas matter a great deal-politicians pursue ideological ends and ideas sway people en masse).
215. Beam et al., supra note 194, at 203-04 (contrasting the politics-of-ideas approach and
interest group politics).
216. David F. Bradford, Tax Reform: Waiting for a New Consensus of the Experts, 79 TAX
NOTES 899, 899 (1998).
217. CONLAN ET AL., supra note 188, at 247 ("[Entrepreneurs] act as middlemen between
professional experts, who formulate and perfect policy solutions, and the broader political arena.
Entrepreneurs simplify and distill those complex ideas and then link them to values that are accepted by
and are familiar to the broader public.").
218. Shaviro, supra note 207, at 93-94.
219. See, e.g., PETE DOMENICI & ALICE RIVLIN, BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., RESTORING
AMERICA'S FUTURE: REVIVING THE ECONOMY, CUTTING SPENDING AND DEBT, AND CREATING A
SIMPLE, PRO-GROWTH TAX SYSTEM (2010), available at
http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/BPC%20FINAL%2REPORT%20FOR%20PRINTE
R%2002%2028%201 l.pdf; FISCAL ROADMAP PROJECT, COMM. FOR RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET, A
PREVENTABLE CRISIs: EXPLORING FISCAL CRISIS SCENARIOS FOR THE UNITED STATES (2010),
available at http://crfb.org/document/preventable-risis-exploring-fiscal-crisis-scenarios-united-states;
Maya MacGuineas, Creating a Fiscal Turnaround in the United States, COMM. FOR RESPONSIBLE FED.
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none seems to have caught the public imagination. Notably, few policy
entrepreneurs have cropped up in Congress. To some extent, this must be
attributed to the weakness of congressional leaders. Shaviro notes that
congressional leaders have "stronger prestige and ideological incentives than
rank and file members" and "tend to be less subject to interest group
influence."22o When congressional leaders control the legislative process,
interest groups are less likely to influence legislation. This creates the
opportunity for policy entrepreneurs among the leadership. If that leadership
were interested in raising revenue, they would have an opportunity to move it
to the legislative agenda. But congressional leadership today is not nearly as
strong as it previously was. One takeaway from this evolution is that interest
group politics becomes more important. Another takeaway is that this
congressional leadership has been displaced by party control. The rise in the
power of the party has also been accompanied by interparty polarization. The
last decade has witnessed virtually no bipartisan efforts in Congress.221 And
yet, a bipartisan effort will be necessary to tackle the budget crisis.
What about the possibility of external pressure for the public interest?
Historically, the leadership for unorganized interests or for the public interest
came from the Treasury Department and the Joint Committee staff. These two
bodies were assumed to be operating in the public interest-they had an
institutional interest in tax policy that operated as a counterweight to economic
self-interest. Over the past decade, however, their influence has waned,
222particularly during periods when the offices were thought to be politicized.
While both offices still provide neutral evaluations of policy, their voices no
longer can be considered a strong offset to interest group politics. Much the
same can be said about public-interest not-for-profit organizations interested in
tax policy. While several of them provide good data and reports,223 they do not
seem to have much effect in the political arena. Another notable decline in
influence is that of labor unions who historically have represented diffuse
BUDGET (Dec. 13, 2010), http://crfb.org/document/creating-fiscal-turnaround-united-states; Solutions,
PETER G. PETERSON FOUND., http://pgpf.org/Special-Topics/HJ-Landing.aspx (last updated Nov. 9,
2010).
220. Shaviro, supra note 207, at 102.
221. Limited bipartisan efforts have occurred outside of Congress. For example, the National
Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform was chaired by former Republican Senator Alan
Simpson and Erskine Bowles, who was Chief of Staff under President Clinton, and the Commission
included members from both sides of the aisle. See Nat'l Comm'n on Fiscal Responsibility & Reform,
Commission Members, FISCALRESPONSIBLITY.GOv, http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/members (last
visited Apr. 5, 2011). None of the Commission's proposals has been adopted, however.
222. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, Paint-by-Numbers Tax Lawmaking, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 609,
614-15 (1995).
223. See, e.g., TAX ANALYSTS, http://www.taxanalysts.com (last visited Feb. 7, 2011); TAX
POL'Y CENTER, http://www.taxpolicycenter.org (last visited Feb. 7, 2011).
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groups, such as lower- and middle-income taxpayers. Today, labor unions have
almost no voice in the tax policy debate. 22 4
Finally, interest group politics can be offset by diffuse unorganized
interests provided there is a strong consensus. Public opinion can act as a
constraint on the legislative process. 225 In this case, as explained further below,
public opinion seems to be strongly in favor of no tax increases.
4. The Poisonous Atmosphere with Respect to Taxes Prevents
Increasing Taxes Directly
Perhaps, no other factor better explains current tax politics (and thus,
the unlikelihood of raising additional revenue) than the poisonous rhetoric with
respect to taxes. It is widely agreed that public discourse about taxation has
taken a nosedive, and it is impossible to discuss taxes publicly in any serious
way.226 The anti-tax movement can be traced to Ronald Reagan, whose fight
for smaller government inevitably brought with it a call for lower taxes. There
are many forces that have carried this forward, from those who want to scrap
the Internal Revenue Code, 227 to the Contract with America's anti-tax
rhetoric, 228 to Steve Forbes's anti-tax presidential campaigns,229 to the
campaign against the so-called "death tax," 230 to the jockeying among 2008
presidential candidates to make the most serious pledge not to raise taxes.231
This is largely attributable to two factors: the obsession with marginal tax
rates and the impossibility of adopting any legislation that could be framed as
"raising taxes." Congress and politicians go to extraordinary lengths to steer
clear of taking any action that might be construed as raising taxes. This
involves both labeling revenue-raising measures as something other than a tax,
as well as trying to avoid raising the tax burden on anyone. An example of the
224. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER
TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 107-08, 110-12 (2005).
225. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public
Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 287 (1988) ("[U]norganized interest
may still have an impact if their preferences are strong and commonly held, for public opinion itself
works as an important constraint on legislative action.").
226. Daniel Shaviro, The Long-Term U.S. Fiscal Gap: Is the Main Problem Generational
Equity?, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1298, 1299 (2009) (lamenting the "debasement of public discourse and
near impossibility of reasoned mainstream political debate about fiscal sustainability").
227. Alison Mitchell, Leaders of G.O.P. Seek To Overhaul Federal Tax Code, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 28, 1997, at Al.
228. See Republican Contract with America, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
http://www.house.gov/house/Contract/CONTRACT.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2011).
229. Leslie Wayne, Flat Tax Goes from "Snake Oil" to G.O.P. Tonic, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14,
1999, at Al; Leslie Wayne, Forbes Emphasizes Position Against Abortion and Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
23, 2000, at Al6.
230. For the history of the term, see Graetz & Shapiro, supra note 224, at 74-84.
231. Prepared Remarks of Senator Barack Obama (D-IL), Democratic Presidential
Candidate, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 12, 2008 (reporting on a speech in which Obama made a "firm
pledge" not to raise taxes on families making less than $250,000); see Karen E. Crummey, McCain
Talks Money, DENVER POST, July 8, 2008, at A-0 1.
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first is the debate over whether the penalty associated with the insurance
mandate in the health-care legislation can be described as a tax.2 32 An example
of the second tactic is the struggle over the 2001 and 2003 Bush tax cuts.
Politicians are only too familiar with what happens if they can be tagged with
raising taxes. The most salient example is President George H.W. Bush's "read
my lips" pledge-it was widely assumed to be a major factor contributing to
his reelection failure when his actions did not follow his lips. 23 3
For the last decade, one political focus has been on marginal rather than
effective tax rates.234 Both the President and Congress are terrified of the
political repercussions of increasing the top marginal tax rate. One fallout from
this obsession is that there can be no public discussion of raising revenue
through a change in the rate brackets. Obviously, there are other ways to raise
revenue-for example, by expanding the base-but the second factor precludes
that as well. Anti-tax forces, particularly the Republican party, have relentlessly
driven home the point that anything that might be described as a tax increase is
bad. Thus, for example, failing to extend a temporary provision is labeled a tax
increase.235
This poisonous atmosphere is exacerbated by the public's lack of
understanding about taxes. The public is remarkably uninformed about fiscal
policy and taxation's role, and this ignorance prevents a public consensus that
will act as a constraint on legislation as usual. While there are of course
excellent and reliable sources of information about tax policy, their readership
is essentially limited to the cognoscenti. The public, on the other hand, gets
most of its information about tax policy from the general media, which usually
limits its discussion of taxes to sound bites. Most of this information comes in
the form of hostility to the concept of taxation. Politicians encourage this
hostility to taxes, particularly the idea that our income tax system is truly
awful.236 Although the shrillness of the rhetoric appears to be aimed at goading
taxpayers into supporting change, the main effect appears to have been to
poison public discussion about taxes.
Another problem is that nearly all of the public discussion focuses on the
revenue side rather than the spending side. Most taxpayers do not seem to
object to pronouncements about the need to end big government, but it is clear
232. See Robert Pear, Changing Stance, Administration Now Defends Insurance Mandate as a
Tax, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2010, at Al 4.
233. See Charles Krauthammer, Op-Ed., Trapped by Campaign Rhetoric, WASH. POST, Feb.
26, 1993, at A23.
234. A focus on rates also brings a focus on redistribution with winners and losers. As Michael
Graetz has pointed out, the discussion has turned to the distributional tables. See Graetz, supra note 222,
at 610-12.
235. See, e.g., Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-222,
§ 102, 120 Stat. 345, 346 (2006) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 1) (extending several temporary tax
provisions).
236. See Marvin A. Chirelstein, Taxes and Public Understanding, 29 CONN. L. REv. 9 (1996)
(noting public hostility to federal income tax, both toward paying taxes and toward the system itself.
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that they do not want to terminate any spending program of which they are
beneficiaries. What motivates taxpayers has been remarkably constant over the
last several decades: to pay as little tax as possible but to receive as many
public benefits as possible.237 This is entirely consistent with public-choice
theory since taxpayers are looking after their own self-interest.
D. The Use ofLow-Salience Taxes as a Second-Best Solution
While no doubt economic considerations such as efficiency are important,
in the real world, tax policy is often dictated by politics. This insight bolsters
the normative argument for the government's taking advantage of cognitive
error. While it would be counterproductive in many cases for the government to
rely on low-salience tax provisions, there are situations where they may enable
the government to achieve otherwise worthy goals. So long as the process is
reasonably transparent and information with respect to the provision is readily
available, there is no convincing argument that it would be wrong for the
government to take error into account by effectively using politically pleasing
taxes or provisions. The salience of the tax is exogenous to the provision itself
in that it arises from the inability or unwillingness of a taxpayer to fully
understand or react to a given provision. Thus, an attempt to minimize the
perceived burden of a tax is not wrong per se. One reason that is so is that all of
the information necessary to determine the actual burden is available.
The political-economy story of the current fiscal crisis and politics of
taxation are a good illustration of when exploiting the cognitive bias in favor of
low-salience taxes would be effective and appropriate. Congress needs revenue,
but raising taxes-particularly through an increase in marginal rates-is
politically difficult. Relying on low-salience tax provisions in a belief that they
are more palatable than continued deficit spending is an acceptable choice for
Congress to make.
Conclusion
Taxes and tax provisions-including the income tax-may have both
economic and political salience. The former may affect economic
decisionmaking and the later may affect the political response to legislation.
This Article has shown that while relying on economic salience to increase
efficiency with respect to the income tax is ambiguous, a democracy-enhancing
case can be made for relying on political salience to increase political
acceptance of low-salience taxes. The normative argument in favor of the
government's exploitation of this cognitive bias does not suggest that this use is
always appropriate or effective. In particular, we do not yet know enough about
either the efficiency effects or the political response to low-salience tax
237. See Shaviro, supra note 207, at 57.
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provisions. Future research could help determine the extent to which economic
responses to changes in income taxes are affected by the salience of the change.
Research might also help to determine whether salience alone or in
combination with other biases actually affects political responses to tax changes
and whether legislators can rely on those responses. We also do not completely
understand whether salience has a "shelf life" and whether, for example,
taxpayers will debias and come to reject low-salience provisions. Much work is
left to be done. But given the strong normative argument for the use of low-
salience provisions, further work on this research agenda is important.
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